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The Unreasonable Case for a Reasonable
Compensation Standard in the Public
Company Context: Why It Is Unreasonable to
Insist on Reasonableness
STUART LAZAR†
According to the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industry Organization (“AFLCIO”), the
average chief executive officer (“CEO”) of a Standard &
Poor’s (“S&P”) 500index company received a total
compensation package of nearly $9.25 million in 2009.1 “At
the same time, millions of workers lost their jobs, their
homes and their retirement savings in the worst financial
crisis since the Great Depression.”2 Specific examples of the
vast amounts paid to corporate executives include:
Kerry Killinger, the former CEO of Washington
Mutual, who was paid $18.1 million in 2006 and $14.4
million in 2007.3 In 2008, Washington Mutual became the
biggest bank failure in American history, was purchased by
JPMorgan Chase, and its shareholders lost all of their
equity in the company.4

† Stuart Lazar is an Associate Professor of Law at the University at Buffalo
Law School. The author would like to thank Benjamin S. Barry (J.D. 2011
University at Buffalo Law School), William G. Sacks (J.D. 2011 University at
Buffalo Law School), and Danielle E. Smith (J.D. 2011 University at Buffalo
Law School) for their input and output in bringing this article to completion.
1. Trends in CEO Pay, AFLCIO, http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/
paywatch/pay/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 27, 2011).
2. James Parks, Don’t Let the Chamber and Big Biz Gut Worker’s Say on
CEO Pay, AFLCION OWBLOG (Oct. 18, 2010), http://blog.aflcio.org/2010/10/18/
dontletthechamberandbigbizgutworkerssayonceopay/.
3. Jon Talton, Outrage Over CEO Pay is So Last Quarter, SEATTLE TIMES ,
June 21, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/jontalton/2009361920_
biztaltoncol21.html.
4. Id.; see also Chuck Saletta, The Beauty of Washington Mutual’s Collapse,
THE MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.fool.com/investing/dividends
income/2008/09/30/thebeautyofwashingtonmutualscollapse.aspx.
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Aubrey McClendon, CEO of Chesapeake Energy,
whose 2008 compensation was $112.5 million.5 Chesapeake
Energy’s net income for 2008 was approximately $623
million, an almost fifty percent decline from the prior year
and the lowest since 2004.6 In the last quarter of 2007,
Chesapeake Energy’s stock traded at a price no lower than
$34.90.7 During the last quarter of 2009, the stock hit a low
of $9.84.8
Ken Lewis, the former CEO of Bank of America,
whose 2008 pay totaled $9 million.9 In that year, Bank of
America received $45 billion in bailout funds from the
federal government10 and fired 30,000 employees.11
But does high executive compensation mean excessive
or unreasonable compensation? And if so, what is the
5. Talton, supra, note 3.
6. See CHESAPEAKE E NERGY CORP ., ANNUAL REPORT P URSUANT TO SECTION
13 OR 15 D OF THE SEC. EXCH. ACT OF 1934 FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED
DECEMBER 31, 2008, at 33 (2009), available at www.sec.gov/edgar/shtml.
7. Id. at 31.
8. Id.
9. Talton, supra note 3.
10. See ANDREW M. C UOMO, N O RHYME OR REASON: T HE ‘HEADS I W IN,
TAILS YOU LOSE ’ BANK BONUS CULTURE 5 (2009), available at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2009/july/pdfs/Bonus%20Report%20Final%2
07.30.09.pdf. In his report, Attorney General (now Governor) Cuomo writes
that:
As one would expect, in describing their compensation programs,
most banks emphasize the importance of tying pay to performance . . . .
As [one bank] executive put it, “employees should share in the upside
when overall performance is strong and they should all share in the
downside when overall performance is weak.”
But despite such claims, one thing is clear from this investigation to
date: there is no clear rhyme or reason to the way banks compensate
and reward their employees.
...
. . . when the banks did well, their employees were paid well. When the
banks did poorly, their employees were paid well. And when the banks
did very poorly, they were bailed out by taxpayers and their employees
were still paid well. Bonuses and overall compensation did not vary
significantly as profits diminished.
Id. at 1.
11. Talton, supra note 3.
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solution to curbing the problem of excessive executive pay?
More specifically, should the Internal Revenue Code12 be
used as a means for regulating the actions of public
companies?
This Article briefly explores these issues. In Part I, this
Article provides a narrative of the excessive compensation
debate. Without drawing a conclusion as to whether
executive compensation is reasonably set or excessive in
nature, Part I summarizes the history of public outrage
surrounding executive pay. Part I also provides a short
discussion of the arguments on each side of the debate. Part
II of this Article analyzes Section 162(a)(1) of the Code,
which provides for the deduction for a reasonable allowance
for compensation. This Part explores the history behind
Section 162(a)(1) and how the provision has been
interpreted to apply only to compensation paid by private,
closely held companies. Part II concludes by determining
that the deduction for reasonable compensation allowed
under Section 162(a)(1) is different than a deduction only
for reasonable compensation and that there is no basis for
judging the reasonableness of compensation in the public
company context. Part III discusses prior tax legislation
enacted in an attempt to control executive pay by setting
forth objective standards of reasonableness in the public
company context. In addition, Part III summarizes the
literature that shows that each attempt to limit executive
compensation not only failed to achieve its goal, but also
may have led to executives of public corporations receiving
larger pay packages. Part IV critiques a recent law review
piece which argues that, not only should the Code be used
as an instrument to regulate executive compensation, but
that the Service should use the vague language of Section
162(a)(1) to achieve this goal.13 The Article concludes by
urging Congress to refrain from using the tax laws to
further regulate behavior in this area.

12. Unless otherwise provided herein, the term “Code” refers to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. The term “Section” refers to a section of the
Code. The term “Service” refers to the Internal Revenue Service.
13. See Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, Comment, Taxing Unreasonable Compensation: §
162(a)(1) and Managerial Power, 119 YALE L.J. 637, 638 (2009) (arguing that a
more expansive interpretation of Section 162(a)(1) by the Service is necessary
“to set executive compensation reasonably”).
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I. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: EXCESSIVE? MAYBE.
INFLAMMATORY? DEFINITELY.
The examples of high levels of executive compensation
cited at the beginning of this Article are not an aberration.
One need only open a newspaper or read a magazine to see
how much executives in the United States are being paid. In
2009, H. Lawrence Culp Jr. had the distinction of being the
highest paid CEO according to a Forbes magazine survey of
the 500 largest companies in the United States.14 Culp
received $954,000 in salary from Danaher Corporation.15
However, he also realized an additional $140 million from
the exercise of vested stock options and as a result of the
vesting of stock awards.16 The next four toppaid chief
executives that year were Lawrence J. Ellison of Oracle
Corporation ($130 million),17 Aubrey K. McClendon of
Chesapeake Energy ($114 million), Ray R. Irani of
Occidental Petroleum ($103 million), and David C. Nowak
of Yum! Brands ($76 million).18
A. A History of Outrage
While, in today’s contentious political climate, the
volume of the outraged voices has soared to a higher
decibel,19 the anger is not new. In the 1930s, a series of
14. Scott DeCarlo, What The Boss Makes, F ORBES .COM (Apr. 28, 2010),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/27/compensationchiefexecutivesalary
leadershipboss10ceocompensationintro.html.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. CEO Compensation, FORBES.COM (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/
lists/2010/12/boss10_LawrenceJEllison_JKEX.html.
18. DeCarlo, supra note 14. Interestingly, total CEO compensation for 2009
decreased by thirty percent when compared to 2008 levels. Id. This was the
third consecutive decrease in CEO compensation, following declines of eleven
and fifteen percent in the prior two years. Id. Notwithstanding the decrease in
compensation earned by these CEOs, between 2006 and 2010 Larry Ellison
earned total compensation of almost $1 billion ($5 million in salary and $980
million from value realized on exercised vested stock options). Id.
19. See, e.g., Nathan Knutt, Note, Executive Compensation Regulation:
Corporate America, Heal Thyself, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 494 (2005) (“In recent
years, executive compensation has received more media attention than ever
before.” (citing Amy Baldwin, Grasso Resigns Under Pressure: $140M Pay
Package for Chairman of NYSE Sparked Public Furor, BOSTON GLOBE , Sept. 18,
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disclosures began the public outcry about excessive
executive pay.20 The response to these disclosures, according
to Professor Wells,
was enormous, amplified by the fact that the disclosures came in
the depths of the Great Depression. Executive compensation leapt
onto the national agenda. In the courts, shareholders sued
directors, claiming that salaries and bonuses paid at their firms
were so large as to constitute “waste” of corporate assets. Those
complaints gained a sympathetic hearing in the United States
Supreme Court. In Washington, D.C., New Deal reformers made
disclosure of executive compensation a key part of the new
Federal Securities Acts [i.e., the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Act of 1934]. Congressmen proposed punitive taxation
to squelch high executive compensation and passed laws capping
21
salaries at corporations receiving federal contracts or aid.

During the 1940s, executive compensation at public
corporations declined.22 From the early 1950s through the
2003, http://www.boston.com/business/markets/articles/2003/09/18/grasso_resig
ns_under_pressure (discussing the resignation of NYSE Chairman Dick Grasso
after his compensation package was disclosed))); Patrick McGeehan, Again,
Money Follows the Pinstripes, N.Y. TIMES , Apr. 6, 2003, § 3, at 1 (discussing
executive compensation packages in the wake of corporate scandals).
20. Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”: The Fight
Over Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 690
(2010) (“It was during the 1930s that the question of how much corporate
executives ought to be paid and whether some were paid too much first became
a national issue.”). Because there was no standardized system of reporting,
exactly how much corporate executives were earning is unclear. Id. at 702.
However, Professor Wells notes that:
[A] study of one hundred large industrial firms found the median
compensation earned by a president in 1929 was $69,728, equivalent in
2009 dollars to $880,648. The study also revealed sharp variations.
Presidents’ compensation ranged from $10,000 a year to $1,635,753.
Though thirty presidents received compensation above $100,000, the
milliondollar pay package was an outlier. The next highestpaid
president received $605,613, and only four of the hundred received
compensation above $300,000.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
21. Id. at 69091; see Grace’s Large Pay Stirs Bonus Debate, N.Y. TIMES , July
27, 1930, § 2, at 9 (noting the public outrage that occurred in 1929 when
Bethlehem Steel paid its president a bonus of more than $1.6 million). See also
infra notes 6974 and accompanying text.
22. Wells, supra note 20, at 75859 (citing Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks,
Executive Compensation: A New View from a LongTerm Perspective, 1936–2005,
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mid1970s, executive compensation grew at a rate of 0.8% a
year—more closely tracing the rate of growth in the average
worker’s income.23 The controversy over executive pay faded
from the public radar until the 1980s.24
During the 1980s and 1990s, the compensation paid to
CEOs of large, publicly traded corporations again began to
rise dramatically.25 In 1980, the average CEO to worker pay
ratio was fortytwo to one (i.e., the average CEO earned
fortytwo times the amount made by the average worker).26
By 1990, the ratio had increased to 107 to one.27 In 2000, the
disparity hit an alltime high with the average CEO earning
525 times the amount earned by the average worker.28 By
2009, the ratio had fallen to 263 to one.29
at 7 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 200735, 2007), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200735/200735pap.pdf).
23. Id. at 759 (citing Frydman & Saks, supra note 22, at 7).
24. Id. at 761 (“Only in the 1980s did many executives start to receive annual
pay packages above $1 million, a development that sparked outcries reminiscent
of the 1930s and marks the beginning of the modern campaigns against
excessive compensation.” (citations omitted)); see also Meredith R. Conway,
Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free: Taxing Executive Compensation, 17
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL ’Y 383, 384 (2008) (“In the 1980s and 1990s, the public
began to protest the large compensation packages executives were receiving.”
(citations omitted)); Susan J. Stabile, Essay, Is There a Role for Tax Law in
Policing Executive Compensation?, 72 ST . J OHN ’S L. REV. 81, 81 (1998) (“The
public often complains that executives of public corporations in the United
States are overpaid.”); Charles Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate
Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM . L. REV . 1867, 1869 (1992) (reviewing
GRAEF CRYSTAL , I N SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991)) (“Recent expressions of concern
from both politicians and representatives of the investing public, however,
indicate that executive compensation may now have reached such levels of
outrageousness that some form of legal reaction is likely to occur.”).
25. See Frydman & Saks, supra note 22, at 1.
26. Trends in CEO Pay, supra note 1.
27. Id.
28. Id.; see also Michael B. Dorff, The Group Dynamics Theory of Executive
Compensation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2025, 2027 (2007) (“[W]hile in the early
1980s public company CEOs earned an average of fortytwo times what factory
workers earned, now they earn some four hundred times as much as factory
workers do.”).
29. See Trends in CEO Pay, supra note 1; see also Executive Pay Watch, No.
0616, BRIEFING BULL . (N.Y. State United Teachers Research & Educ. Servs.,
Latham, N.Y.), May 2006, available at http://nysut.org/research/bulletins/
20060525paywatch.html (“Not only is this compensation high, but there is an
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The protest continues today.30 For example, in 2002,
William J. McDonough, thenPresident and CEO of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Chairman of the
Bassel Committee on Banking Supervision, stated that
there is “nothing in economic theory to justify the levels of
executive compensation that are widely prevalent today.”31
In 2006, Former Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. wrote, “[t]hese huge
paydays, I believe, undermine corporate governance and
send a signal that boards are willing to spend shareholders’
money lavishly . . . .”32 In 2010, Professor Kenneth Davis, a
professor of Law and Ethics at Fordham University
Graduate School of Business, proclaimed that “[e]xecutive
compensation has come to mean corporate greed. Too many
managers appointed to protect the interests of shareholders
are looting their companies.”33
increasing gap between the compensation of CEOs and that of the workers.
According to a study reported in the New York Times of April 9, 2006 half of
Executives in 1990 earned 55 times the average workers pay compared to 104
times the average workers pay in 2004. In 2004 the top 10 percent of Executives
earned at least 350 times the pay of the average worker which is up from 122
times in 1990 and 74 times in 1950.”).
30. See Knutt, supra note 19, at 49394; see also Bengt Holmstrom, Pay
Without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A Comment, 30 J.
CORP. L. 703, 706 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY
W ITHOUT PERFORMANCE : THE UNFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
(2004)) (“Exhorbitant levels of executive pay have upset the public and the
politicians.”); Michael S. Weisbach, Optimal Executive Compensation versus
Managerial Power: A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried’s Pay Without
Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, 45 J. ECON.
LITERATURE , 419, 419 (2007) (book review) (“Over the last few years, corporate
governance has become a popular topic in both the business and academic press.
The large number of highpublicity scandals, the seemingly enormous salaries
paid to executives, and the celebrity status of CEOs has created unprecedented
public interest in corporate governance.”).
31. William J. McDonough, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve
Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the William Taylor Memorial Lecture: Issues of
Corporate Governance (Sept. 29, 2002).
32. Arthur Levitt, Jr., Corporate Culture and the Problem of Executive
Compensation, 30 J. CORP . L. 749, 749 (2005).
33. Kenneth R. Davis, Taking Stock—Salary and Options Too: The Looting of
Corporate America, 69 MD. L. REV. 419, 419 (2010). The public outrage has, not
surprisingly, spilled over to the legislators that such public elects. Professor
Davis notes that “[a]n enraged Charles Grassley, the ranking Republican of the
Senate Finance Committee, declared that AIG employees who took taxpayer
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B. Is Compensation Excessive?
Despite the large amount written about excessive
compensation, there is a vigorous debate regarding whether
such pay packages are truly excessive. According to
Professor Lowenstein,
Executive compensation is like global warming; true believers and
doubters are sharply arrayed against one another debating
whether there is a problem and, if so, what are its causes and
cures. Some observers believe that the compensation paid to
America’s top executives is clearly excessive, while others doubt
34
that a problem exists.

The group that believes that executive compensation is
excessive can be divided into two separate factions.35 The
first group focuses on executive compensation “as a problem
that both reflects and exacerbates poor corporate
governance,” while the second group “focuses on executive
compensation as a source of increasing economic, political,
and social inequality.”36 This Article focuses only on the first
concern, leaving the economic, political, and social policy
discussions for others to debate.37
money should ‘follow the Japanese model and come before the American people
and take that deep bow and say I’m sorry, and then either do one of two
things—resign, or go commit suicide.’” Id. at 421 (citations omitted).
34. Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35
W AKE FOREST L. R EV. 1, 2 (2000) (footnotes omitted). However, Professor
Loewenstein concludes that those who believe executive compensation is
excessive are more numerous. Id. at 2 n.2.
35. See Brett H. McDonnell, Two Goals for Executive Compensation Reform,
52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 585, 586 (2007) (“[T]here are at least two very different
types of concerns that lead to two very dissimilar goals for proposals to reform
executive compensation.”).
36. Id. (citations omitted).
37. For an example of commentators focused on these policy concerns, see
RUSSELL S. W HELTON, EFFECTS OF EXCESSIVE CEO PAY ON U.S. SOCIETY 15
(2006), available at www.svsu.edu/emplibrary/Whelton%article.pdf (“Excessive
pay, defined as compensation that is 20% or greater than the national average
CEO salary, has changed the relationship between CEOs and stakeholders.
While the free market society can present valid reasons for the escalation in
wages, the overwhelming majority of data concludes that the impact on society
is detrimental.”). Similarly, Professor Linda Barris notes that:
While the costpershare to the corporation for a multimillion dollar
compensation package is small, the cost to the firm in terms of human
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Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried authored
the seminal work reflecting the first of these factions,
arguing that executive compensation is inefficient and
excessive.38 Their “managerial power” theory states that
compensation paid to corporate executives has often
“deviated from arm’slength contracting because directors
have been influenced by management, sympathetic to
executives, insufficiently motivated to bargain over
capital is far greater. Those same pay packages which provide
executives with incentives create disincentives for employees.
Executive compensation strikes at key economic issues: employee
morale and productivity.
Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to
Controlling Executive Pay, 68 I ND. L.J. 59, 6970 (1992). In discussing reasons
for regulating executive compensation, Professor Barris concludes that “[t]he
theory . . . is simple: Public policy does not support extreme distortions in
income distribution, and taxpayers should not have to subsidize highlevel
executives through business tax deductions.” Id. at 79.
38. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & J ESSE FRIED, PAY W ITHOUT P ERFORMANCE : T HE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); see GRAEF
CRYSTAL , I N SEARCH OF EXCESS 4250 (1991) (describing how a CEO will hire a
compensation consultant to raise arguments persuasive to a compensation
committee made up of outside directors, themselves frequently CEOs of other
companies, who are “not very adept at statistics and corporate finance,” but who
are friends with the CEO and themselves concerned about their own salaries);
Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate
Democracy, 41 BUFF . L. REV . 1, 3739 (1993) (applying the law of small group
dynamics to the relationship between the board of directors and the chief
executive officer); Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharaoh’s Heart: Harnessing
Altruistic Theory and Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in Executive
Salaries, 51 BUFF . L. REV. 811, 82526 (2003) (showing that there is no evidence
to support a link between executive ability and compensation); Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM . L. REV. 1461, 148993
(1989) (CEO compensation practices do not align interests of managers and
shareholders); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax Policy Case for Denying
Deductibility to Excessive Executive Compensation: Disguised Dividends,
Reasonable Compensation, and the Protection of the Corporate Income Tax Base,
58 TAX NOTES 1123, 1125 (1993) (“The contemporary critique of managerial
remuneration suggests that, in determining arm’s length salaries for corporate
executives, the salaries paid to [other CEOs] are not acceptable comparables,
since those salaries are also set in a closed system by selfdealing managers and
are thus inflated beyond competitive levels.”). But see Tod Perry & Marc Zenner,
CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder
Expropriation?, 35 W AKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 12326, 144 (2000) (concluding
that the preponderance of evidence points toward increased alignment of the
interests of shareholders and managers).
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compensation, or simply ineffectual in overseeing
compensation.”39 This leads to a board and management
that set compensation in a manner inconsistent with
shareholder preferences.40 This managerial power arises
because boards of directors at public companies are
beholden to corporations’ top executives, in large part,
because corporate management controls the director
nomination
process.41
In
other
words,
corporate
compensation committees do little to protect the corporation
in its pay negotiations with the CEO, which leads to levels
of executive pay not based on a market dynamic.42 The only
constraint on this process is outrage—either from
shareholders or the general public—which only works in
extreme cases of executive overcompensation.43
39. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 38, at 4.
40. Id. at 6162.
41. Id. at 2527.
42. See Lawton W. Hawkins, Compensation Representatives: A Prudent
Solution to Excessive CEO Pay, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 449, 45354 (2007).
43. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 38, at 6470. A number of commentators
have criticized the analysis of Professors Bebchuk and Fried. See, for example,
John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without
Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK &
J ESSE FRIED, PAY W ITHOUT PERFORMANCE : THE U NFILLED PROMISE OF
EXECUTIVE C OMPENSATION (2004)), where the authors note that:
While we agree with some of the analysis offered in Pay Without
Performance, we think it is important to put its arguments into
perspective. In a nutshell, the key issue is whether the problems
Bebchuk and Fried discuss are examples of a few bad apples or are
evidence that the whole barrel is rotten. The essence of their claim
that the entire barrel is bad rests on the following assumption: If
contracts are optimal, they do not reflect managerial power, and if
contracts reflect managerial power, they are suboptimal. The authors
view evidence of managerial power as evidence that the system is
failing and that reform is needed.
We agree that it is useful to consider the effect of managerial power
on compensation, but disagree with their interpretation of the
consequences of such power. It is true that contract structures reflect
CEO power, and that CEOs with more power get more pay, but this
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that CEO pay is not
optimized for shareholders, nor does it imply that CEO pay needs
reform.
More generally, our Review points out that Bebchuk and Fried have
missed some important aspects of executive pay and incentives. As a
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The other side of the debate—those who believe that
executive compensation is reasonable—generally argue that
market competition sets the prices for such pay.44 Professor
Nicholas Wolfson notes that “there is an active market for

result, they have not shown that there are systematic failures with
U.S. CEO compensation, and therefore have not shown that reform is
needed.
Id. at 114344 (footnotes omitted). See also Holmstrom, supra note 30, at 704
(“[I]t is a big leap from the criticism of executive pay to the authors’ main
conclusion that there is a need for wholesale reform of corporate governance.”).
44. See Robert Thomas, Is Corporate Executive Compensation Excessive?, in
THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA 276, 278 (M. Bruce Johnson ed., 1978)
(“Competition among corporations . . . sets the level of executive
compensation.”); Joseph E. Bachelder, Comments on Pay Without Performance,
30 J. CORP . L. 777, 77883 (2005); Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion
and Investors’ Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 54243
(1984) (“[C]ompetition over the course of years and decades induces managers to
act in the interests of investors.”); Core et al., supra note 43, at 1144 (expressing
doubt that Bebchuk and Fried have shown there are systematic failures in U.S.
executive compensation); Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who
Should Set CEO Pay? The Press? Congress? Shareholders?, H ARV. B US . REV .,
MayJune 1992, at 28, 3032; Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every
Nickel They Get, HARV. BUS . REV., Mar.Apr. 1986, at 125, 12526; Frydman &
Saks, supra note 22, at 34 (noting different theories put forward to explain the
rise in executive compensation); cf. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy,
Performance Pay and TopManagement Incentives, 98 J. POL . ECON. 225, 227
(1990) (offering hypothesis that political forces implicitly regulate executive
compensation). Professor Kevin Murphy concludes:
The BFW [Bebchuk, Fried, and Professor David Walker from Boston
University] analysis is comprehensive and provocative, and their
evidence that pay practices reflect more than optimal contracting
concerns is compelling. Equally compelling is their evidence that most
pay decisions are not made by truly independent boards in legitimate
arm's length transactions. Ultimately, though, their managerial power
view is both problematic as a theoretical matter, and too simplistic to
explain executive pay practices. Moreover, their hypothesis is largely
inconsistent with the most important development in executive
compensation practices: the recent escalation in optionbased
compensation for both toplevel and lowerlevel executives. Overall,
their prescription to focus on rent extraction in examining “the
regulation and practice of corporate governance” is potentially
misguided and diverts attention from more important issues regarding
executive compensation.
Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power
Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 850 (2002).

948

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

corporate executives” and that excess wages “are eliminated
by the active competition for [these] positions.”45
One reason for the high levels of executive pay is the
demand for “top executive talent.”46 Professor Bengt
Holmstrom notes that “in the second half of the 1990s,
executives had lucrative opportunities outside their
traditional jobs—as investors or partners in redhot venture
and buyout markets, for instance, or as entrepreneurs.”47
However, the increase in executive pay cannot be attributed
solely to demand. Rather, Professor Holmstrom concludes
that a large portion of such increase stems from the overall
rise in shareholder value—which led, through the increased
use of stock options for corporate executives, to large
increases in executive compensation.48
Professor Stephen Bainbridge notes that the ideas
presented by Bebchuck and Fried are neither new,
complete, nor relevant.49 With respect to the originality of
the arguments contained in Pay Without Performance,
Professor Bainbridge notes that similar ideas about the
separation of corporate ownership and control can be traced
45. Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 959,
977 (1980). Wolfson concludes by stating “both empirical evidence and
responsible economic theory indicate that shirking in the form of ‘excessive’
compensation is controlled by market forces.” Id. at 978.
46. Holmstrom, supra note 30, at 706 (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 70607.
48. Id. at 707. Ironically, it was Congress’ attempt to reform executive pay
through the enactment of Section 162(m) that has led to the increased use of
equity compensation. See infra text accompanying note 189.
49. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX .
L. REV. 1615, 162643 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION (2004)). While this statement appears to reflect a high degree of
skepticism of Bebchuk and Fried’s research, Professor Bainbridge concludes his
review of their work by stating that:
Bebchuk and Fried are to be praised for having written a book that
makes highly technical doctrinal and economic analysis accessible to
the educated lay reader, while not dumbing down some very
sophisticated analysis. They have laid out a provocative argument and,
in many respects, offered considerable supporting evidence.
Unquestionably, they have made a valuable and provocative
contribution to the literature.
Id. at 1662.
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back to Berle and Means in the 1930s, and to Alfred
Marshall and William W. Cook in the 1890s.50 Even the idea
that corporate managers control their own pay was
discussed more than a decade before Bebchuk and Fried
published Pay Without Performance.51
In discussing the completeness of their claims, Professor
Bainbridge states “Bebchuk and Fried cannot exclude
competing explanations for much of the evidence on which
they rely.”52 In other words, Bebchuk and Fried’s
interpretation of the data is “often plausible but
contestable.”53 Other commentators also note that the
managerial power model can exist side by side with optimal
contracting theories.54 Thus, even where managerial power
exists, “observed contracts anticipate and try to minimize
the costs of this power, and therefore may be written
optimally.”55
50. Id. at 162627 (citing HERBERT H OVENKAMP , E NTERPRISE AND AMERICAN
LAW: 18361937, at 16, 357 (1991)); see also ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER
MEANS , T HE M ODERN CORPORATION AND P RIVATE P ROPERTY 68118 (1932).
51. Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 1627 (citing Charles M. Elson, Director
Compensation and the ManagementCaptured Board—The History of a
Symptom and a Cure, 83 S.M.U. L. REV. 127, 127128 (1996)). Professor Elson
stated that:
The most significant problem facing corporate America today is the
managementdominated, passive board of directors. A common
occurrence in many of our largest corporations is that passive boards
are responsible for excessive executive compensation and, more
importantly, poor corporate performance. The board, created to monitor
management in order to ensure effective decisionmaking, has evolved
into a body that, in its most extreme form, simply “rubber stamps”
executive prerogative. Management, no longer checked, freely engages
in conduct that is slothful, illdirected, or selfdealing—all to the
corporation’s detriment.
Elson, supra, at 12728.
52. Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 1628.
53. Id. at 1629.
54. E.g., Core et al., supra note 43, at 115960.
55. Id. at 1160. In discussing significant research done by other scholars in
this area, Professor Bainbridge notes that:
These examples are not intended as a comprehensive rebuttal of the
managerial power model, but rather to highlight the possibility that
many executive compensation practices are at least as consistent with
an arm’slengthbargaining model as the managerial power model.
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Finally, Professor Bainbridge argues that Bebchuk and
Fried’s theory may be less relevant than they claim since
there is “relatively little evidence that CEOs are motivated
by pay . . . .”56 If this claim is correct, and pay and
performance are decoupled, “many of the practices Bebchuk
and Fried condemn as products of management power take
on a more benign appearance.”57 If, however, there is a link
between pay and performance—a link which the evidence
suggests is weaker than “commonly supposed”—“Bebchuk
and Fried’s observation that executives receive a
considerable amount of pay that is not performance
sensitive has far less policymaking traction than they claim
for it.”58
In their 2007 book, Myths and Realities of Executive
Pay, Ira Kay and Steven Van Putten present a different
view of executive pay than Bebchuk and Fried—one that
establishes a successful pay for performance structure, an
efficient labor market, and an effective corporate
governance model.59 In response to the argument that
executive pay is not tied to corporate performance, Kay and
Van Putten set forth substantial evidence to support their
conclusion that “[f]or most companies, there is substantial
payforperformance
sensitivity.
Simply
put,
high
performance generates high pay, and low performance
generates low pay.”60 Based on their analysis, Kay and Van
Putten make a number of conclusions about the U.S. pay for
performance system, including the fact that executives
generally receive only a small portion of the value that they
create for corporations and their shareholders,61 that
This Review Essay is not intended to provide a complete literature
review. Instructively, however, a number of scholars who have
undertaken a more exhaustive review of the literature have concluded
that the evidence is considerably less compelling than Bebchuk and
Fried claim.
Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 1631 (footnote omitted).
56. Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 1632.
57. Id. at 1634.
58. Id. at 1637.
59. I RA T. KAY & STEVEN VAN P UTTEN, M YTHS AND REALITIES OF EXECUTIVE
PAY 13 (2007).
60. Id. at 10.
61. Id. at 1012.
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executive pay rises and falls with corporate financial
performance,62 and that a highly competitive executive labor
market leads to pay packages that reflect the need to recruit
qualified talent.63
In discussing the managerial power theory, Kay and
Van Putten note that the research sparked by Pay Without
Performance generally criticizes the managerial power
theory and rejects the policy implications that flow
therefrom.64 These authors conclude that, based on the
62. Id. at 1517.
63. Id. at 1720.
64. Id. at 30; see, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay Without Performance:
The Tournament Alternative, 54 EMORY L.J. 1557, 1578 (2005) (“One theoretical
weakness of the managerial power approach is that it assumes that CEO
influence over the compensation process translates into inefficient compensation
contracts. This assumption ignores, however, the fact that in the principalagent
model firm performance is itself a function of the compensation contract. In
other words, by specifying a more efficient compensation contract, the incomes
of both shareholders and executives can be increased.”); Randall S. Thomas,
Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven?,
57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 117382 (2004) (arguing that the pay gap between U.S.
and international CEOs is market driven); Core et al., supra note 43, at 1182
("Bebchuck and Fried's policy recommendations for government intervention are
based on their assessment that executive pay practices are failing, which we do
not believe to be true. Therefore, we see no broad justification for the policy
recommendations that they give."); see also supra note 44 (Professor Murphy
quote). Kay and Van Putten note that:
Most academics, board members, and compensation consultants,
and certainly all largecompany executives, think that Bebchuk and
Fried’s theory is deeply flawed. In fact, the academics—the most
independent and scientific commentators in this whole matter—have
found that the U.S. executive compensation model benefits the U.S.
economy . . . .
But Bebchuk and Fried’s theory has received a warm response from
the media, including the New York Times and The Economist; selected
executive compensation critics, such as Arthur Levitt, former SEC
chairman; and some institutional investors—especially those
representing unionized employees and state employees. And even
though the larger institutional funds have criticisms of executive pay,
they are generally satisfied with the outcome: the return to them as
shareholders. If they could achieve the same returns for less executive
pay, they would certainly install that model. Their shareholding and
proxy voting behavior suggests, however, that they doubt a different
model would produce the same results.
KAY & VAN PUTTEN, supra note 59, at 33.
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research, “while there is a great amount of managerial
power inside the corporation, it is trumped by payfor
performance, balanced bargaining power, and other
attributes of the CEO labor market.”65
So, has either side convincingly made its case regarding
the reasonableness of executive compensation? Perhaps the
best way to conclude a summary of the existing debate over
executive compensation is to end where we began, noting
that:
As with most normative questions, the question of whether
CEOs are appropriately compensated perhaps cannot be decided
based on compelling, conclusive evidence to support an answer.
. . . Ultimately, whether one believes that CEOs are over or
appropriately compensated probably is a personal judgment. Each
of us may have our own personal answer, but it would be difficult
to argue that it is the right answer.
. . . Whether executive compensation is excessive or equitable
appears to remain an open question in spite of the many
66
arguments and research on the topic.
65. KAY & VAN PUTTEN, supra note 59, at 30. In one challenge to Bebchuk and
Fried, Professor Randall Thomas proposes five alternative theories for why U.S.
CEOs are paid more than their foreign counterparts. Thomas, supra note 64, at
1176. Professor Thomas concludes:
In my view, economic forces are the most important factor in the
determination of the market pay rate for CEOs and other top
executives. The CEO’s contribution to her firm’s value, or the top
executive’s best alternative job opportunities, are powerful explanations
of her relative pay scale. It seems unlikely that these values are fixed
through some massive secret conspiracy to keep managerial pay levels
high.
Id. at 1265.
66. Donald Nichols & Chandra Subramaniam, Executive Compensation:
Excessive or Equitable?, 29 J. BUS . ETHICS 339, 349 (2001). Even if corporate
executives are overcompensated, this may not represent a problem. Professor
Yablon states that:
But is such overcompensation a problem? The dominant perspective
in the press and among many politicians is to assume that there is
something deeply wrong when corporate CEOs pay themselves
millions in salaries while closing plants and laying off thousands of
workers. But this is fundamentally an argument about
appearances. . . .
While it is hard to find anyone in public life willing to respond with
a hearty “So what?” to the evidence that American CEOs are grossly
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C. Abandoned Attempts to Regulate Executive Pay
Although the question of whether executive
compensation is excessive remains an open one, there have
been attempts to limit such compensation through the Code
since the public outrage over executive pay began.67 While it
might seem prudent to determine that a problem exists
before attempting to provide solutions,68 Congress has not
seen fit to wait.
For example, in the 1930s, there were several
unsuccessful attempts to impose excise taxes on “excessive”
compensation. In 1932, the Senate Finance Committee
proposed both adding an eighty percent surtax on
compensation above $75,000 and eliminating the
corporation’s deduction for the same.69 According to the
overcompensated, there is much economic literature to support
precisely that position. Economic theory has long recognized that
whenever there is a separation of ownership and control in a firm, a
potential conflict of interest is created between the owners of the firm
and the agents they hire to run the business. This problem of agency
cost is exacerbated in the public corporation, no single owner of which
has a sufficient incentive to monitor corporate management and to
seek the reduction of such agency costs. It is perfectly plausible to
argue, and many economists do, that a certain amount of selfserving
behavior by corporate managers—including payment to themselves of
excessive compensation—is simply the cost of doing business and part
of the costs inherent in the use of the public corporation as the
primary vehicle for carrying on economic activity in the United States.
Yablon, supra note 24, at 187475 (footnotes omitted). But see Jerry W.
Markham, Regulating Excessive Executive Compensation—Why Bother?, 2 J.
BUS. & TECH. L. 277 (2007) (asking not “so what?” but “why bother?” with
respect to the question of whether the government should have a role in policing
executive compensation).
67. See infra text accompanying notes 6983.
68. This is not an original notion. See Loewenstein, supra note 34, at 4 (“No
serious consideration of solutions to the ‘problem’ of executive compensation
should proceed before determining whether, in fact, CEOs are overpaid.”).
69. See S. R EP . NO. 72665, at 1314 (1932). The Senate Report notes that
with respect to the eighty percent surtax on excess compensation, the
“committee believes that under present circumstances compensation, to the
extent that it exceeds compensation at a rate of $75,000 per year, should not be
regarded as reasonable compensation for incometax purposes . . . .” Id. at 13.
With respect to the compensation deduction, the report notes that “the payment
of any compensation to any person of an amount which exceeds compensation at
the rate of $75,000 per year should be regarded, for income tax purposes, as in
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Report of the Senate Finance Committee, the “large
amounts of compensation, particularly in the form of
bonuses, emoluments, and rewards frequently paid to the
officials of corporations are greatly in excess of reasonable
compensation.”70 In 1934, a brief outcry for taxes made a
similar proposal appear more likely to pass.71 But limits on
executive compensation failed to appear in the Revenue Act
of 1934.72 During the drafting of the 1934 Act, Texas
Senator William McFarlane proposed the creation of a
steeply graduated income tax that “would confiscate
incomes as they approached $1 million.”73 Although Senator
McFarlane’s highlyprogressive tax rates would have
affected all incomes (whether from executive compensation
or otherwise), his unsubstantiated statements made on the
Senate floor—citing salaries and bonuses granted to
executives at large U.S. corporations (specifically, American
Tobacco and Bethlehem Steel)—reflected his belief that the
increased compensation paid to corporate executives was
not justified by an increase in corporate responsibilities.74
excess of reasonable compensation for personal services actually rendered . . . .”
Id. at 14.
70. Id. at 13.
71. See Wells, supra note 20, at 751 (citing Big Salaries Bring Demand for
Curbs, N.Y. TIMES , Mar. 5, 1934, at 6); see also Philip M. Payne, Corporation
Salaries and Bonuses and The Federal Income Tax, 12 TAX. MAG. 301, 33334
(1934) (noting these amendments proposed by Senator Al Gore Sr. and another
proposal by Senator McKellar that would have denied a deduction for salary or
compensation in excess of $50,000 per year).
72. See Wells, supra note 20, at 751 (citing MARK H. LEFF , THE LIMITS OF
SYMBOLIC REFORM : T HE NEW DEAL AND T AXATION, 19331939, at 8889 (1984)).
73. Id. (citing 79 CONG. R EC. 10,98384 (1935) (statement of Sen.
McFarlane)). Senator McFarlane’s proposal called for a surtax to be placed on
net income which would have the effect of “placing a ceiling on personal incomes
of not to exceed $1,000 per week or about $52,000 net per year.” 79 CONG. REC .
10,984 (1935) (statement of Sen. McFarlane).
74. 79 CONG. REC. 10,984 (1935) (statement of Sen. McFarlane). Senator
McFarlane concluded that:
The additional pay in no sense represents earned incomes, but are paid
by reason of the fact that these individuals are able to dominate and
control oftentimes with very little actual ownership of the business. The
excessive salaries which they receive represent accumulated profits
diverted from the stockholders into their pockets. The salary of the
President of this country is only $75,000. I believe no officer in
commercial enterprises should receive more.
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In 1992, shortly before the enactment of Section 162(m),
Senator Tom Harkin introduced legislation that would have
amended Section 162 to redefine the term “reasonable
allowance for salaries or other compensation” to include
only the first $500,000.75 Senator Tom Daschle introduced a
similar bill that would have allowed the $500,000 limitation
to be increased for costofliving adjustments.76
In another attempt to legislate executive pay,
Representative Martin Sabo introduced a bill in every
session of Congress beginning in 1991 until his retirement
in 2006 that would have disallowed a tax deduction for
executive salaries in excess of twentyfive times the salary
of the lowest paid employee in the same organization.77
None of these bills were ever voted upon.78 After
Id.
75. S. 2329, 102d Cong. (1992). See also infra Part III.A.
76. S. 2261, 102d Cong. (1992).
77. See Income Disparities Act of 1991, H.R. 3056, 102nd Cong. (1991);
Income Equity Act of 1993, H.R. 3278, 103rd Cong. (1993); Income Equity Act of
1995, H.R. 620, 104th Cong. (1995); Income Equity Act of 1997, H.R. 687, 105th
Cong. (1997); Income Equity Act of 1999, H.R. 740, 106th Cong. (1999); Income
Equity Act of 2001, H.R. 2691, 107th Cong. (2001); Income Equity Act of 2003,
H.R. 2888, 108th Cong. (2003); Income Equity Act of 2005, H.R. 3260, 109th
Cong. (2005).
78. An article in New York Magazine best summarizes the legislation
proposed by Representative Sabo:
On the House side, a rather poorly thoughtout and simplistic bill by
Democrat Martin Sabo of Minnesota would set an arbitrary ceiling on
how much money chief executives should be paid; any portion of an
executive’s salary that is more than 25 times the salary of the lowest
paid fulltime employee in the company would not be deductible by the
company as a business expense.
Why 25 times? Sabo explains that he used the current minimum
wage as a starting point and found that a 25times increase would
result in a salary of roughly $200,000. “That’s what the President of
the United States gets,” says Sabo. “Why should some corporate
executive get more?”
Christopher Byron, Strike It Rich: On the CEO Pay Patrol, N.Y. MAG., Feb. 17,
1992, at 21. Representative Sabo’s rationale for limiting executive compensation
to the salary paid to the President of the United States is reminiscent of the
statements made by Senator McFarlane more than onehalf century earlier. See
79 Cong. Rec. 10,984 (1935) (statement of Sen. McFarlane). Both statements
might remind readers of Babe Ruth’s statement regarding his own
compensation. In 1930, when asked by a reporter what he thought of the fact
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Representative Sabo retired from the House of
Representatives, Representative Barbara Lee assumed
responsibility for his crusade.79 To date, Representative
Lee’s bills have met the same fate.
A more recent attempt to enact tax provisions to
regulate executive pay arose in the wake of widespread
public outrage over reports of American International
Group, Inc.’s (“AIG”) payment of large retention bonuses
after receiving more than $170 billion in government
assistance.80 In 2009, the House of Representatives passed a
that his annual salary of $80,000 was greater than the $75,000 annual salary
earned by President Hoover, Ruth responded, “I know, but I had a better year
than Hoover.” See Norman Chad, Just a Little History, W ASH. POST , Sept. 27,
2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A523562004Sep26.html.
79. Income Equity Act of 2007, H.R. 3876, 110th Cong. (2007); Income Equity
Act of 2009, H.R. 1594, 111th Cong. (2009); Income Equity Act of 2011, H.R.
382, 112th Cong. (2011). It should be noted that, beginning with the 2009 bill,
Representative Lee’s proposed legislation would eliminate the deduction for
executive compensation in excess of the greater of $500,000 or twentyfive times
the compensation paid any other employee. In addition, such legislation
expands the definition of “compensation” to include a wider array of fringe
benefits. Compare H.R. 3876 with H.R. 1594.
80. See, for example, Tim Reid, Outrage Over AIG Bonuses Threatens to
Derail Obama’s Rescue Plans, TIMES (London), Mar. 19, 2009,
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_fin
ance/article5934395.ece, describing the “tidal wave of public anger” as follows:
The enormous public anger and outrage on Capitol Hill stems from the
fact that the bonuses paid to 418 employees, including $1 million each
to 73 people, came after the company had been rescued with $170
billion of taxpayers’ money. It comprises the biggest injection of public
cash into a single company since the financial crisis began last year,
and another $30 billion will be paid soon.
Id.; see also Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract
Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94
MINN. L. REV . 368, 369 (2009) (“Responding to public outrage, the House of
Representatives sought to impose a retroactive marginal taxation rate of ninety
percent on the AIG bonuses (as of the date of this writing, the bonus tax had
passed in the House of Representatives, but not the Senate).” (citing John
Christoffersen, AIG Execs’ Lavish Homes Draw Busload of Activists, SEATTLE
TIMES , Mar. 22, 2009, at A4)); Michael M. Phillips, Outrage Overflows on
Capitol Hill as Lawmakers Denounce Bonuses, W ALL ST . J., Mar. 19, 2009, at
A4; Liam Pleven et al., AIG Faces Growing Wrath over Payouts, W ALL ST . J.,
Mar. 16, 2009, at A1; Jonathan Weisman et al., Treasury Will Make Grab to
Recoup Bonus Funds, W ALL ST . J., Mar. 18, 2009, at A1. For an example of a
statement of Congressional outrage, see supra note 33.
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bill that would have imposed a tax at a rate of ninety
percent on certain bonuses paid to individuals with adjusted
gross incomes over $250,000 by financial institutions that
received more than $5 billion in federal assistance under
the Treasury Department’s Troubled Asset Relief Program
(“TARP”).81 The tax imposed by the proposed bill, H.R. 1586,
would have been in addition to any other tax imposed by the
Code (including any income tax), but would not have
applied if the recipient irrevocably waived his or her
entitlement to such bonus or returned such amount to his or
her employer “before the close of the taxable year in which
such payment [was] due.”82 A similar bill was introduced in
the Senate, but was never brought to a vote.83
Not all attempts to limit executive compensation
through the Code have failed to survive the legislative
process. In fact, several provisions currently exist to deny a
deduction, impose a tax surcharge, or to accelerate the
inclusion of income for compensation that Congress has
determined should not be subsidized by the taxpayers.84
However, as discussed herein, all of these provisions set
forth brightline standards to determine which portion of
the compensation qualifies for a tax deduction and for which
portion public subsidization is unavailable.85

81. See H.R. 1586, 111th Cong. (2009) (imposing an additional tax on bonuses
received from certain TARP recipients).
82. Id.
83. See Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, S. 651, 111th Cong. (2009). The
Senate version of the excise tax on excessive compensation provided for a tax at
a rate of seventy percent—split equally between the employer and the
employee—on the amount of any bonus payment in excess of $50,000 paid to
certain employees of TARP recipients. Id. It should be noted that outrage over
the TARP bailout did result in some changes to the Code affecting the executive
compensation provisions in Sections 162(m) and 280G. See Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110343, § 302, 122 Stat. 3765, 380306. A
discussion of these provisions is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion
of Section 162(m), see Part III.A. For a discussion of Section 280G, see Part
III.B.
84. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (West 2010); I.R.C. § 280G (West 2010); I.R.C. § 409A
(2006); I.R.C. § 4999 (West 2010).
85. See infra Part III.
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II. INTERPRETING THE CODE TO ADDRESS UNREASONABLE
PUBLIC COMPANY COMPENSATION
While the Code has certain objective standards for
determining whether compensation paid by a public
company is reasonable,86 the question may be raised as to
whether the tax laws should go further in attempting to
limit executive compensation. While numerous articles have
previously concluded that the limitation on deductions for a
reasonable allowance for compensation applies only to
closely held companies,87 one commentator has recently
called for the Service to step in and regulate executive
compensation by unilaterally expanding the scope of its
amorphous statutory authority under Section 162(a)(1) to
deny deductions for compensation paid to executives of
public companies that are not “reasonable” in amount.88 In a
recently published piece, Aaron Zelinsky argues that the
Service has consistently misapplied the statute by failing to
treat publicly traded and privately held corporations in a
similar manner.89
Part IV of this Article provides a further critique of
Zelinsky’s views. His argument is incorrect for two reasons.
First, as discussed in this Part, such an approach is
inconsistent with Congress’ intent in enacting Section
162(a)(1) and its predecessors, the plain meaning of the
statute, and prior application of such provisions. Second, as
discussed in Part III, past attempts to limit compensation of
corporate managers have led to increased executive pay
rather than controlling such amounts.

86. See infra Part III.
87. See, e.g., Conway, supra note 24, at 392; Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence
and Accidents: Regulation of Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 13
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485, 50809 (2009); Stabile, supra note 24, at 85;
Andrew W. Stumpff, The Reasonable Compensation Rule, 19 VA. TAX REV. 371,
37576 (1999); Ryan Miske, Note, Can’t Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended
Consequences of Trying to Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax
Code, 88 MINN. L. R EV. 1673, 1676 (2004).
88. See Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 638.
89. See id.
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A. Section 162(a)(1): Deducting a Reasonable Allowance for
Compensation
The Code provides that “[t]here shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business.”90 This business expense deduction is part of the
framework of our tax system, which divides a taxpayer’s
expenditures into three categories: business expenses,
business expenditures, and personal expenses. Only
amounts that fall within the first of these three categories
are immediately deductible under Section 162(a).91 Business
expenditures are required to be capitalized, and may only be
depreciated or amortized over time in accordance with their
useful life or under another method specifically prescribed
by the Code.92 Personal expenses are generally
nondeductible, although certain Code provisions do allow
individuals to deduct certain personal expenses.93
Section 162(a)(1) provides one such deductible business
expense—a deduction for “a reasonable allowance for
salaries or other compensation for personal services actually
rendered.”94 However, neither the Code nor the Treasury
90. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006).
91. I.R.C. § 162(a).
92. I.R.C. § 263 (2006); see, e.g., I.R.C. § 167 (West 2010); I.R.C. § 168 (West
2010); I.R.C. § 179 (West 2010); I.R.C. § 195 (West 2010); I.R.C. § 248 (2006);
I.R.C. § 709 (2006).
93. I.R.C. § 262 (2006). Professor Marvin Chirelstein notes that:
Business expenses—the costs incurred by the taxpayer in earning gross
income—are nondiscretionary in the sense that the income is
conditioned on the outlay. Personal expenditures reflect the disposition
which the taxpayer elects to make out of the wealth that she has
earned. Business expenses must necessarily be deductible if the income
tax is to be imposed on “income”; for the same reason, personal
expenditures should be disallowed.
MARVIN A. C HIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 103 (11th ed. 2009).
Professor Chirelstein also states that “[w]hile the line between business and
personal expense is of the essence in all this, the fact is that Congress itself has
chosen to cross that line fairly freely by allowing deductions for a variety of
items which are plainly personal in nature.” Id. at 104.
94. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1). The initial language of Section 162(a) provides a
general rule that ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in
connection with carrying on a trade or business should be deductible, while at
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regulations define what constitutes a “reasonable allowance
for salaries or other compensation.”95 Rather, whether
compensation is reasonable is based on all the facts and
circumstances
surrounding
the
payment.96
One
commentator notes, with disapproval, that “[n]evertheless,
the IRS has systematically interpreted § 162(a)(1) to apply
only to closely held corporations, effectively concluding that
‘any amount of compensation paid by a publicly held
corporation should be per se reasonable,’ even though §
162(a)(1) does not differentiate between the reasonableness
of publicly owned and privately held corporations.”97
the same time—through the use of the word “including”—provides three specific
examples of deductible business expenses. See I.R.C. § 162(a). Although
numerous cases stand for the proposition that deductions should be narrowly
construed, there is no authority providing that these three examples are all
inclusive. See, e.g., INDOPCO v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial
Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934); see also infra text accompanying
notes 13843.
95. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1627 (2010). See also Zelinsky,
supra note 13, at 639 n.8 (“The term ‘reasonable compensation’ is not defined by
the tax code or the Treasury regulations.” (quoting Conway, supra note 24, at
391)). In addition, Anne Moran notes:
The concept of reasonableness for compensation presents the same
types of issues that it does in limiting a reasonable allowance for
depreciation or depletion, and in computing the reasonable needs of a
business for purposes of the accumulated earnings tax. The concept
defies simple interpretation by tax experts in the same manner that
the hypothetical reasonable man escapes precise definition by
negligence lawyers and the concept of reasonable doubt remains an
elusive factor in criminal law.
Anne E. Moran, Reasonable Compensation, 3905th TAX MGMT . PORTFOLIOS
(BNA), at A3 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
96. See E. Wagner & Son v. Comm’r, 93 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1937).
97. Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 639 (quoting Anne E. Moran, Reasonable
Compensation, 3904th TAX MGMT . PORTFOLIOS (BNA), at III.B.4 (2009)); see
also Conway, supra note 24, at 392 (“[Courts] have applied the [§ 162(a)(1)]
standard primarily to limit payments by closely held companies where those
companies have tried to disguise nondeductible dividends as compensation
which would be deductible.”); Stumpff, supra note 87, at 377 (“Reasonable
compensation cases virtually always involve a fact pattern . . . [with] . . .
payments to an employee who is also a shareholder of a closelyheld
corporation.”); Miske, supra note 87, at 1676 (“The concept of reasonableness is
primarily intended to stop closely held businesses from artificially increasing
employee compensation in an attempt to disburse profits in a deductible form,
as opposed to a nondeductible form such as gifts or dividends.”).
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Zelinsky is correct in stating that the reasonableness
standard traditionally has been applied only to
compensation paid by closely held corporations. Case law
and legislative history show, however, that his view of the
expansive nature of such provision is both erroneous and
lacks support.
Prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1913, a
similar issue was analyzed under the PayneAldrich Tariff
Act.98 In United States v. Philadelphia Knitting Mills Co.,
the Third Circuit was confronted with the issue of whether
a corporation could be denied a deduction for salary paid to
its president on the grounds that such amount was
unreasonable.99 At the trial court level, the district court
ruled that a deduction could not be denied based on the
amount paid, but only based upon evidence that the
payment was, “in whole or in part, [a] distribution[] of
profit[].”100 The district court ruled for the taxpayer.101 On
appeal, the Third Circuit agreed that the government could
not, absent statutory authority, inquire into the
reasonableness of the compensation paid.102 The court,
98. Ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11 (1909) (repealed 1913). The PayneAldrich Tariff Act of
1909 imposed an excise tax on corporations for the privilege of doing business in
corporate form. See id. §38, 36 Stat. at 112. The amount of excise tax imposed
was measured by corporate income. Id.
99. 273 F. 657, 658 (3d Cir. 1921).
100. Id. at 65758.
101. United States v. Phila. Knitting Mills Co., 268 F. 270, 272 (E.D. Pa.
1920).
102. United States v. Phila. Knitting Mills Co., 273 F. 657 (3d Cir. 1921). The
court stated that:
Confining our inquiry to the statute, it appears that the basis on
which a salary may be allowed as a valid deduction is that it was in
fact an “ordinary and necessary expense (of the corporation) actually
paid . . . in the maintenance and operation of its business.” . . .
Whether services were rendered and whether also they were
commensurate with the salary paid are matters of judgment and
discretion reposed by general law in the board of directors of the
corporation. As the board of directors is charged with the duty and
clothed with the discretion of fixing the salaries of the corporation’s
officers, the Government has no right (until expressly granted by
statute) to inquire into and determine whether the amounts thereof
are proper, that is, whether they are too much or too little. But, while
the amount of salary fixed by a board of directors is presumptively
valid, it is not conclusively so, because the Government may inquire
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however, found sufficient evidence existed that the
compensation paid was not entirely salary, but rather part
of the corporation’s profits paid to a shareholder, and
remanded the case back to the district court on such
grounds.103
Both the Revenue Act of 1913 and the Revenue Act of
1916 allowed an unqualified deduction for “ordinary and
necessary expenses.”104 Language relating to a deduction for
compensation was first added to the statutory lexicon with
the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1918.105 However, the
congressional committee reports relating to the 1918 Act
shed no light on the rationale for adding this specific
reference.106 Two conflicting arguments have been advanced
for this statutory change. The first asserts that the
language added in 1918 was intended to limit the business
expense deduction, while the other contends that the new
language was intended to expand the scope of such
deduction.107
whether the amount paid is salary or something else. . . . It has a
right, therefore, to attack the action of a board of directors and show
by evidence, not that a given salary is too much, but that, in the
circumstances, the whole or some part of it is not salary at all but is
profits diverted to a stockholding officer under the guise of salary and
as such is subject to taxation.
Id. at 65859.
103. Id. at 65960.
104. See Moran, supra note 95, at A1  A2. See also Revenue Act of 1913, ch.
16, § II(g)(b), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (providing corporations with a deduction for “all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid within the year in the maintenance
and operation of its business and properties . . . .”); Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463,
§ 12(a), 39 Stat. 756, 762 (providing the same deduction for corporations).
105. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 214(a)(1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919) (with
respect to individuals); Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 234(a)(1), 40 Stat. at 1077
(1919) (with respect to corporations). Each of these provisions provide a
deduction for “[a]ll the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including a reasonable
allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually
rendered . . . .” Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 214(a)(1), 40 Stat. at 1066 (1919);
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 234(a)(1), 40 Stat. at 1077 (1919).
106. See H.R. REP . NO. 1037 (1919), reprinted in 19391 C.B. (Part 2) 13067;
H.R. REP . N O. 767 (1918), reprinted in 19391 C.B. (Part 2) 86117; SEN. REP .
NO. 617 (1918), reprinted in 19391 C.B. (Part 2) 117130.
107. See Moran, supra note 95, at A1  A2.
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The argument for a restrictive interpretation for the
business expense deduction—i.e., that the Service should
impose a “reasonableness” requirement on compensation—
looks to the regulations promulgated under the Revenue Act
of 1916.108 The language serving as evidence for such
conclusion provides that, with respect to employee bonuses:
If such payments, when added to the stipulated salaries, do not
exceed a reasonable compensation for the services rendered, they
will be regarded as a part of the wage or hire of the employee, and
therefore an ordinary and necessary expense of operation and
109
maintenance, and as such deductible from gross income.

According to one commentator, this regulation proves
that the concept of reasonableness in the regulations was
intended as a limiting factor reflecting the Service’s desire
to police compensation deductions, “particularly in the case
of closely held or related taxpayers.”110 “The statutory
reasonable compensation clause appears to have been the
normal outgrowth of this administrative position.”111
A closer analysis of these regulations, and of other
regulations promulgated around that time, leads to a
different
conclusion.
While
Treasury
Regulations
promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1913 made no
reference to reasonable compensation, such regulations
provided that “[a]mounts . . . based upon the stockholdings
of such officers or employees, are held to be dividends, and
although paid in lieu of salaries or wages, are not allowable
deductions from gross income, for the reason that dividends
are not deductible.”112 Treasury Regulations promulgated
under the Revenue Act of 1916 similarly disallowed a
deduction for payments purportedly labeled as salaries
through the imposition of a reasonableness test designed to
determine whether such amounts were, in reality, disguised
dividends.113 Similarly, the language cited above from these
108. Id.
109. Treas. Reg. 33 (Rev.), art. 138 (1918).
110. Moran, supra note 95, at A2.
111. Id.
112. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 119 (1914).
113. See Treas. Reg. 33 (Rev.), art. 138 (1918), which provides that:
Salaries of officers or employees who are stockholders will be subject
to careful analysis, and if they are found to be out of proportion to the
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same regulations in support of imposing a reasonableness
requirement on bonuses reads in full as follows:
Special payments, sometimes denominated as gifts or bonuses to
employees of corporations, will constitute allowable deductions
from gross income in ascertaining net income for the purpose of
the income tax, when such payments are made in good faith and
as additional compensation for the services actually rendered by
the employees. If such payments, when added to the stipulated
salaries, do not exceed a reasonable compensation for the services
rendered, they will be regarded as a part of the wage or hire of the
employee, and therefore an ordinary and necessary expense of
operation and maintenance, and as such deductible from gross
114
income.

When read in this light, it is clear that the
reasonableness of the compensation or bonuses paid to
corporate employees should not be determined in the
abstract.115 The concept of reasonable compensation was
intended solely to distinguish payments of compensation
from payments that represented gifts or dividends, and not
to impose a requirement that actual payments of
compensation be reasonable in order to allow the payor a
tax deduction.116 In fact, with respect to gifts and bonuses,
rather than limiting the deductibility of payments, the
regulations intended to expand their deductibility by
reclassifying amounts paid as gifts or bonuses as deductible
compensation in situations where such amounts do not
exceed a reasonable level of compensation.117 This language
does not address amounts already classified as
volume of business transacted, or excessive when compared with the
salaries of like officers or employees of other corporations doing a
similar kind or volume of business, the amount so paid in excess of
reasonable compensation for the services will not be deductible from
gross income, but will be treated as a distribution of profits.
114. Id.
115. See Note, The Deduction of a “Reasonable Allowance for Salaries”—The
Undefined Power of the Commissioner, 56 HARV. L. R EV. 997, 998 (1943) (“It
thus appears that the notion of reasonable allowance was designed to help
distinguish compensation payments from gifts, while the distinction between
salaries and dividends was made to turn upon the relationship of the payment
to the capital invested in the business.”).
116. Treas. Reg. 33 (Rev.), art. 138 (1918).
117. Id.
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118. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1627, 8, 9 (1960). In fairness to those that support
a narrower view of the reasonable compensation limitation in Section 162(a)(1),
Treasury Regulation Section 1.1627(b)(3) does provide that “[i]n any event the
allowance for the compensation paid may not exceed what is reasonable under
all the circumstances.” However, most of the current regulations relating to the
compensation deduction focus on the relationship between the payor and the
payee in determining whether such payments should be allowed as a
compensation deduction rather than the absolute amount. See, for example,
Treasury Regulation Section 1.1627(b)(1), which provides that:
(b) The test set forth in paragraph (a) of this section and its practical
application may be further stated and illustrated as follows:
(1) Any amount paid in the form of compensation, but not in
fact as the purchase price of services, is not deductible. An
ostensible salary paid by a corporation may be a distribution of
a dividend on stock. This is likely to occur in the case of a
corporation having few shareholders, practically all of whom
draw salaries. If in such a case the salaries are in excess of
those ordinarily paid for similar services and the excessive
payments correspond or bear a close relationship to the
stockholdings of the officers or employees, it would seem likely
that the salaries are not paid wholly for services rendered, but
that the excessive payments are a distribution of earnings
upon the stock. An ostensible salary may be in part payment
for property. This may occur, for example, where a partnership
sells out to a corporation, the former partners agreeing to
continue in the service of the corporation. In such a case it may
be found that the salaries of the former partners are not
merely for services, but in part constitute payment for the
transfer of their business.
In addition, see Treasury Regulation Section 1.1628, which states that:
The income tax liability of the recipient in respect of an amount
ostensibly paid to him as compensation, but not allowed to be deducted
as such by the payor, will depend upon the circumstances of each case.
Thus, in the case of excessive payments by corporations, if such
payments correspond or bear a close relationship to stockholdings, and
are found to be a distribution of earnings or profits, the excessive
payments will be treated as a dividend. If such payments constitute
payment for property, they should be treated by the payor as a capital
expenditure and by the recipient as part of the purchase price.
For a regulation focusing on both the relationship between the payor and payee,
as well as the amount of the payment, see Treasury Regulation Section 1.1629,
which provides that “[d]onations made to employees and others, which do not
have in them the element of compensation or which are in excess of reasonable
compensation for services, are not deductible from gross income.”
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Professor Erwin Griswold argues for a more expansive
business expense deduction, stating that the purpose of the
reasonable allowance language “was to enlarge the
deduction . . . by allowing a deduction for amounts which
had not actually been paid . . . .”119 According to Professor
Griswold, “there is no foundation in the statute for [using
the reasonable allowance language] as a means of
restricting the deduction of amounts which had actually
been paid.”120 Professor Griswold notes that such language
first appeared in regulations in order to ease the hardship
caused by the Excess Profits Tax of 1917121 on businesses
that paid little or no compensation to its owners/officers
employees.122 According to one commentator, Congress later
119. See Erwin N. Griswold, Note, New Light on “A Reasonable Allowance for
Salaries,” 59 HARV. L. REV. 286, 290 (1945) (emphasis omitted).
120. Id.
121. Ch. 159, 39 Stat. 1000.
122. See Treas. Reg. 41, art. 39 (1918); Griswold, supra note 119, at 28889.
With respect to individuals, these regulations provided that:
An individual carrying on a trade or business having an invested
capital may in computing the net income of the trade or business for
purposes of the excess profits tax deduct a reasonable amount
designated by him as salary or compensation for personal service
actually rendered by him in the conduct of such trade or business. In no
case shall the amount so designated be in excess of the salaries or
compensation customarily paid for similar service under like
responsibilities by corporations or partnerships engaged in like or
similar trades or businesses.
Treas. Reg. 41, art. 32 (1918). Additionally, regulations provided that
partnerships could deduct reasonable salaries or compensation paid to
individual partners for personal services actually rendered during the taxable
year if the payment were made in accordance with prior agreements and were
properly recorded on the books of the partnership. See id. Similar relief from the
Excess Profits Tax was provided to closely held corporations through a Treasury
Department publication. See Griswold, supra note 119, at 288 (citing OFFICE OF
THE C OMM ’ R OF I NTERNAL R EVENUE , U.S. T REASURY DEP ’T , E XCESS P ROFITS
TAX PRIMER ¶ 51 (1918)). The Excess Profits Tax Primer provided:
51. A corporation in which most of the stock is owned by its officers
has in the past voted to its officers only nominal salaries as drawing
accounts. In computing net income for purposes of the excessprofits tax
may the corporation deduct as items of expense amounts which would
constitute reasonable compensation for the services actually rendered
by its officers?
Yes, if a satisfactory explanation is given. For any period prior to
March 1, 1918, reasonable salaries for services actually rendered may

2011]

REASONABLE COMPENSATION

967

incorporated the reasonable compensation clause in the
Revenue Act of 1918 in order to furnish a statutory basis for
the relief granted by these regulations.123 Case law and
administrative pronouncements similarly support this
view.124
The Board of Tax Appeals, however, interpreted the
new language found in the Revenue Act of 1918 to be a
mandate to inquire into the reasonableness of compensation
actually paid.125 This interpretation found approval with the
courts.126 The interpretation is incorrect, though, when
be deducted, even though the full amounts had not been formally voted
as salaries by the corporation.
EXCESS PROFITS TAX P RIMER , supra, ¶ 51.
123. See Moran, supra note 95, at A2; see also Griswold, supra note 119, at
288 (noting that the language of the Revenue Act of 1918 and the previous
administrative authorities were “essentially the same”).
124. In Appeal of Gottlieb Bros., 1 B.T.A. 684 (1925), the Board of Tax Appeals
relied on Treasury Regulation 41, Article 39 to allow a partnership deduction for
reasonable salaries for services rendered even though such salaries were never
paid. The Board concluded that:
The regulation quoted seems to us reasonable and proper in the light of
the whole intent and purpose of Title II of the Revenue Act of 1917. It
certainly does justice where a strict application of the letter of the
statute would do grave injustice. It has been regularly and consistently
applied by the Commissioner from its promulgation in 1917 until at
least as recently as February, 1924 (A.R.R. 6087, C.B. III1, 128).
Gottlieb Bros., 1 B.T.A at 686. In A.R.R. 6087, III1 C.B. 128 (1924), the Board of
Tax Appeals concluded that a partnership was entitled to deduct a reasonable
amount for partners’ salaries for services even though no such payments had
actually been made. The Board, in discussing the regulations, noted that the
intent and purpose when drafting the regulations was to “recognize the
unfortunate and inequitable position in which many partnerships had been
placed by the advent of the excessprofits tax in 1917 without having had any
previous income tax history or experience to guide them in the adjustment of
their affairs so as to secure equitable salary deductions.” Id. at 129. The Board
went on to note “it has been the practice of the Income Tax Unit to allow a
reasonable amount for partners’ salaries . . . even though none were actually
paid and no agreement existed for payment thereof.” Id.
125. See Moran, supra note 95, at A2.
126. See id. (citing Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U.S. 115 (1930);
Gustafson Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 1 B.T.A. 508 (1925)). In Gustafson, the court
concluded that the compensation paid to the majority shareholder of a close
corporation was not reasonable. 1 B.T.A. at 510. In so holding, however, the
court did not distinguish between the compensation paid by a close corporation
to a shareholder and compensation paid to persons who were not also
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viewed in light of both the Congress’ intent in revising the
statute and the statutory language.
B. A Reasonable Allowance for Compensation Is Different
Than Reasonable Compensation
Having previously discussed Congress’ intent behind
the 1918 addition of a deduction for a reasonable allowance
for compensation,127 an exploration into the literal language
of the statute is warranted. The Code does not specifically
enumerate a deduction for reasonable compensation.
Rather, Section 162(a) provides that “[t]here shall be
allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business, including . . . .”128 Section
162(a)(1), which forms a part of this provision, permits a
deduction for a “reasonable allowance for salaries or other
compensation for personal services actually rendered.”129 By
analyzing the statutory construction of Section 162(a), two
distinct arguments develop. First, a deduction for a
reasonable allowance for compensation is different than a
deduction for reasonable compensation. Second, the
language “including” should not be read as limiting.
Only three Code sections use the term “reasonable
allowance” in determining the amount of a deduction to
which a taxpayer is entitled.130 All other Code provisions
allowing taxpayers a deduction, including the general

shareholders. According to the court, “[u]nder the provision of this section the
Commissioner not only has the authority but it is his duty to determine under
all the facts obtainable the reasonableness or unreasonableness of deductions by
a corporate taxpayer of compensation paid.” Id.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 11224.
128. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006).
129. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).
130. Section 162(a)(1) provides the deduction for a reasonable allowance for
compensation for services actually rendered. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1). Section 167
allows a depreciation deduction for a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion,
wear and tear, and obsolescence of property used in a trade or business or held
for the production of income. I.R.C. § 167(a) (2006). Section 611(a) provides a
reasonable allowance for depletion in the case of certain natural resources.
I.R.C. § 611(a) (2006).
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business expense deduction of Section 162(a), require that
actual amounts be paid, incurred, or sustained.131
In understanding the meaning behind such phrase, a
few principles of statutory construction are relevant. First,
“reasonable allowance” is a term of art, and should be
afforded the general understanding given such term.132
Second, as a matter of statutory construction, where the
same phrase is used in one or more related statutes, it
should be accorded the same meaning.133 Finally, where a
different phrase is used in similar statutes, it should be
accorded a different meaning.134
Although the term “reasonable allowance” is used as a
term of art in the Code and in tax parlance, not much is
written about its meaning. However, where the term is
used, it is generally presumed to mean an estimated, rather
131. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 2010) (providing a deduction for interest
paid or accrued during the taxable year); I.R.C. § 164(a) (West 2010) (allowing a
deduction for taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year); I.R.C. § 165(a)
(2006) (providing a deduction for losses sustained during the year); I.R.C. §
170(a) (2006) (allowing taxpayers to deduct charitable contributions made or, in
the case of corporations on the accrual method of accounting, deemed made
during the year); I.R.C. § 213 (2006) (allowing a deduction for medical expenses
paid during the year not compensated for by insurance or otherwise); I.R.C. §
215 (2006) (providing a deduction for actual amounts of alimony or separate
maintenance paid during the year).
132. YULE KIM , C ONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97589 STATUTORY I NTERPRETATION :
GENERAL P RINCIPLES AND R ECENT TRENDS 6 (2008). Kim states that:
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed. In such a case, absence of contrary direction may be taken
as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as departure from
them.
Id. (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (Jackson, J.)).
133. See id. at 13 (“A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is
generally read the same way each time it appears.” (quoting Ratzlaf v. United
States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994))).
134. Id. at 14 (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section
of a statute but omits it in another . . . , it is generally presumed that Congress
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”
(quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993))).
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than an actual, amount.135 Congress’ decision, then, to allow
a deduction for a reasonable allowance for compensation
rather than a deduction for reasonable amounts of
compensation is significant. As a matter of statutory
construction, the term “reasonable allowance” found in
Section 162(a)(1) should be read in a manner similar to the
same term in Section 167—as a deduction for an estimated
amount—and should be distinguished from other provisions
that allow a deduction for actual amounts.136 This is
135. See, for example, J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN ’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
FEDERAL I NCOME TAX LAWS , 19381861, at 968 (1938), where the legislative
history to the Revenue Act of 1916 provides an interesting discussion of the
meaning of such term in the context of the deduction for a reasonable allowance
for actual reduction in flow and production in the case of oil and gas wells. In
that discussion, Senators Lane and Williams argue the method of calculating
such reasonable allowance. Senator Lane concludes that the amount is an
estimate that is “merely arbitrary.” Id. In determining the deduction for
traveling expenses under Section 162(a)(2), the Service permits taxpayers to
take a deduction for a “per diem” (i.e., a standard allowance) for lodging, meals
and automobile mileage. See I NTERNAL REVENUE SERV ., PUB. 463, TRAVEL ,
ENTERTAINMENT , GIFT , AND CAR EXPENSES 47 (2011). Although the Service
never defines the term “per diem,” a commonly accepted definition for such term
is as follows:
The meal per diem is a reasonable allowance for meals and incidental
expenses for the area. It is not intended to be a reimbursement for
actual expenses but rather a reasonable allowance. Some travelers may
spend more than the amount for personal travel expenses while others
may spend less than the M&IE per diem but the principle behind the
per diem is that it is a reasonable amount to cover the traveler’s
necessary expenses.
Controller’s Office, Procedure 20335c: Meals & Incidental Expenses, VIRGINIA
TECH, http//www.co.vt.edu/Procedures/p20335c.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
For an example of the use of the term “reasonable allowance” outside of tax law,
see Kansas Statute section 50645(c), which provides that “a reasonable
allowance for the consumer’s use of the vehicle” is not an actual amount but an
estimate based on a publication by the American Automobile Association. KAN
STAT . ANN. § 5645(c) (2011). A Minnesota statute provides an expense
allowance for members of governmental boards or agencies set as “a reasonable
allowance for expenses or a per diem allowance in lieu of expenses.” MINN.
STAT . § 375.47 (2010).
136. In discussing the deductibility of intangibles under a “reasonable
allowance” standard, the Supreme Court has noted that:
[S]ince 1918, at least some intangible assets have been depreciable.
Because intangible assets do not exhaust or waste away in the same
manner as tangible assets, taxpayers must establish that public taste
or other socioeconomic forces will cause the intangible asset to be
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especially true in light of the history explaining that the
deduction for a “reasonable allowance” for compensation
was intended to allow taxpayers to estimate the amount
that would or should have been paid by a closely held
business had salaries been paid to the ownersofficers
through an armslength negotiation in order to alleviate the
burden of the Excess Profits Tax.137

retired from service, and they must estimate a reasonable date by
which this event will occur.
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 556 (1993) (citing
BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, J R ., FEDERAL I NCOME T AXATION OF
I NDIVIDUALS ¶ 12.4 (1988)). In cases where Congress has determined what a
“reasonable allowance” is, it has enacted legislation specifying what constitutes
reasonable. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 197 (2006) (enacted in response to Newark
Morning Ledger to provide a fifteen year period for amortizing certain
intangibles); I.R.C. § 168 (West 2010) (providing specific guidance with respect
to the methodology for depreciating tangible property); I.R.C. § 195 (West 2010)
(providing a fifteen year amortization period for startup expenditures); I.R.C. §
248 (2006) (providing a 180 month amortization period for corporate
organizational expenditures); I.R.C. § 709 (2006) (same for partnership
organizational expenditures).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 11924. Professor Griswold also notes:
Then there are the words “reasonable allowance” for services “actually
rendered.” These have never quite fitted the Treasury’s recent
construction of the phrase as a limiting provision. But they are quite
natural once it is realized that the phrase is an enlarging provision,
allowing the deduction of amounts although they have not actually
been paid. For, since there is not an actual payment to determine the
amount of such a deduction, there must be some limit or measure, and
this was expressed as a “reasonable allowance,” with the further
limitation that the allowance could be made only for services “actually
rendered.” With this new light on the background of the provision, it is
apparent that it has no bearing on the deduction of salary payments
actually made, and furnishes no proper basis for the disallowance of
any deduction. This view is confirmed by the fact that the language was
not in fact used by the Treasury as a limitation on the deductibility of
salaries for many years after it was enacted—during all of the period
when the persons who were familiar with its origin and purpose were
still in office.
Griswold, supra note 119, at 290.
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C. Reasonableness Should Not Be a Limiting Factor in
Determining Deductibility of Actual Compensation
Once it is settled that a reasonable allowance for
compensation refers to an estimated amount, the issue
remains whether a deduction is allowed for actual
compensation paid regardless of its reasonableness. The
answer should be yes. The Code provides a deduction for
“all” the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business.138
These words are followed by three specific deductions which
are added to Section 162(a) through the use of the word
“including.”139 The term “including” is a nonexclusive term
that is intended to introduce examples.140 The specific
examples found in Section 162 are illustrative of situations
that depart from the provision’s general rules and require
additional explanation. This Article has already discussed
why a deduction for an estimated amount of compensation
is different from other deductions for amounts paid.141 The
paragraph allowing a deduction for traveling expenses
provides a limitation that such expenses must be incurred
by a taxpayer “while away from home in the pursuit of a

138. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006).
139. I.R.C. § 162(a).
140. See M. DOUGLASS BELLIS , FED. J UDICIAL CTR., STATUTORY STRUCTURE
LEGISLATIVE D RAFTING CONVENTIONS : A PRIMER FOR J UDGES (2008),
which states:

AND

It has become a convention in federal law that the term “including”
means what it usually means in English. It is a nonexclusive “for
instance” type of phrase. If I say I have some change in my pocket,
including a penny and a dime, most people would expect that I might
have some other coins as well. Few would think I meant to exclude that
possibility. But in legal writing in general, there seems a worry that
“including” means that what follows is a complete list of the elements.
There are even a few federal laws that use the term “including but not
limited to.” The “but not limited to” should be thought of as surplusage.
Id. at 11. In the context of the deduction for a reasonable allowance for
compensation, see Griswold, supra note 119, at 290, which states that “[t]here is
first the word ‘including,’ which has never made sense as the introduction to a
restrictive phrase.”
141. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1); see supra Part II.B.
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trade or business.”142 The third enumerated deduction, the
deduction for rental payments, is similarly limited—only
those payments that are for property in which the taxpayer
does not have or is not taking an equity interest are
deductible.143
In other words, to be deductible a business expenses
must meet the requirements of Section 162(a) and not be
disallowed or restricted under another provision of the Code
(including the restrictions and limitations applicable to
those expenses specifically enumerated in Section 162(a)).
As discussed previously, capitalized expenditures and
personal expenses are not deductible.144 Only those expenses
that are considered customary, ordinary, or usual are
deductible under Section 162(a).145 Accordingly, the question
is whether compensation paid by a corporation is
customary, ordinary, or usual, or whether the deduction for
such amount is qualified by a reasonable standard.146
Most commentators would argue that compensation
must be reasonable to be deductible, and, that while the
Service has generally applied this standard only to closely
held corporations, this reasonableness requirement
similarly could be applied to public corporations.147 This
142. I.R.C. § 162(a)(2). In addition, as stated previously, the deduction for
travel expenses allows taxpayers to use an estimated amount in determining
the size of the deduction. See supra note 135.
143. I.R.C. § 162(a)(3).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 9293.
145. See Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 188, 195 (1940).
146. Compensation that does not satisfy the “ordinary and necessary”
standard of Section 162(a) should not be deductible. In this vein, compensation
intended to pay an employee for future services spanning several years would
not be ordinary and, accordingly, should be capitalized. Similarly, compensation
paid to provide services not related to a trade or business should be found not to
be necessary and, therefore, nondeductible.
147. Mullane, supra note 87, at 510 n.90 (“Most commentators agree that the
statutory language of 162(a)(1) would support challenges of executive
compensation levels, even in public companies.” (citations omitted)); see also
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax Policy Case for Denying Deductibility to Excessive
Executive Compensation: Disguised Dividends, Reasonable Compensation, and
the Protection of the Corporate Income Tax Base, 58 TAX NOTES 1123, 1124
(1993) (“The code’s restriction on the deductibility of compensation to
reasonable, i.e., arm’s length, levels literally applies to all corporations; in
practice, however, the IRS and the courts have invoked section 162(a)(1) only as
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author believes, however, that the Service has not applied a
reasonableness
standard
to
determine
whether
compensation is deductible,148 but rather that the Service
has used a reasonableness criterion to differentiate those
payments that are deductible business expenses from
disguised dividend payments made to shareholders in an
attempt to avoid the imposition of a corporate level tax.149 In
so doing, the Service generally has correctly limited its
analysis of the reasonableness of employee compensation to
payments made to shareholders of closely held corporations.
This conclusion—that the Service uses a reasonableness
standard as a mechanism for uncovering nondeductible
shareholder
distributions
disguised
as
deductible
to closely held corporations, and Congress apparently has acquiesced in this
longstanding application of the reasonable compensation rule.”); Edward A.
Zelinsky, Reasonable Compensation: A Study in Doctrinal Obsolescence 10
(Cardozo Law Sch. Working Paper Series No. 31, 2000), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract.id=254928 (“Nothing in the
statute limits the test of reasonability to closelyheld corporations or otherwise
supports the IRS’s de facto interpretation of Section 162(a)(1) as constraining
only closelyheld corporations.”). But see Bernard Wolfman, Professors and the
“Ordinary and Necessary” Business Expense, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1089 (1964),
where Professor Wolfman notes:
Section 162(a)(1) (“reasonable allowance for salaries”) has been
thought to provide special warrant for the disallowance as
“unreasonable” of excessive salary payments. But the fact is—and
should be recognized and stated—that salary payments are disallowed
when they are found to be for something other than services, e.g., to
cover a living or hobby expense of a shareholderemployee or just a
“salary” so much in excess of competitive requirements that it is
recognized as a distribution to a shareholderemployee of corporate
earnings. Literal subservience to a presumed requirement of
“reasonableness” has led, however, to wholly unjustified disallowance
in an arm’slength employeremployee situation . . . and ignores
legislative history.
Id. at 1115 n.97 (citations omitted).
148. But see Barbara F. Sikon, Note, The Recharacterization of Unreasonable
Compensation: An Equitable Mandate, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301, 305 (2004).
(“The purpose of section 162 is to allow employers to deduct salary payments
that are reasonable. Conversely, deductions for unreasonable salary payments
must be disallowed.”).
149. See id. at 303 (“The deduction limitation of section 162 has been applied
historically in a manner that illuminates a singular purpose, that is, to unveil
payments of a noncompensatory nature that have been disguised as
compensation to create a tax benefit.” (citing Stumpff, supra note 87, at 380)).
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compensation—is supported by two factors. First, the case
law surrounding Section 162(a)(1) is replete with cases
involving payments made by closely held corporations to
related persons but lacking of cases involving public
corporations.150 As one commentator notes, it is not
unnatural for reasonable compensation cases to arise in the
case of payments between a closely held corporation and
either a shareholder or a shareholder’s relative:
compensation is a deductible expense, while neither
dividends nor gifts are deductible in computing a
corporation’s taxable income.151 In fact, thousands of cases
have been decided analyzing the reasonableness of
compensation in the closely held corporation.152 “Less
appreciated, however, is the nearly complete absence of
decisions denying a deduction where a truly arm’slength
relationship existed between the employer and employee.”153
150. See id., where Sikon states:
The intent of the restriction to reasonableness of section 162, to
unveil noncompensatory payments disguised as compensation, is
supported both by 1) the consistency with which section 162 has been
applied to payments to related parties in closelyheld businesses, and
2) the notable absence of cases involving payments made by large,
publiclytraded corporations. Although large corporations can make
excessive salary payments, they are not attacked through section
162(a) because the character of the payments as compensation is not
subject to dispute. The excessive payments lack the potential to be
reclassified as dividends due to the strict uniformity of dividend
payments made by a publiclyheld corporation . . . . Challenges
through section 162(a) have been reserved for closely held businesses,
in which the owner can determine both the amounts and the
characterizations of payments to employees. This attests to the
function of section 162(a) as a vehicle to scrutinize the proper
characterization of a transaction.
Id. at 308.
151. Stumpff, supra note 87, at 377.
152. Id. (citing Gerald A. Kafka, Reasonable Compensation, 3902d TAX MGMT.
PORTFOLIO (BNA), at A5 (1993)). Stumpff notes that “[t]he ‘reasonable
compensation’ issue ranks among the most frequently litigated of all tax
questions.” Id. at 37273 n.4 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO/GGD95232, TAX ADMINISTRATION : R ECURRING I SSUES IN TAX DISPUTES
OVER BUSINESS EXPENSE DEDUCTIONS 1517 (1995)).
153. Id. at 37778 (emphasis omitted). Stumpff cites only a single case in
which a payment by a corporation to a person unrelated to a corporation’s
shareholders was recharacterized as other than compensation. Id. at 37778
(citing Patton v. Comm’r, 168 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1948)). While the facts of Patton
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This author has found no cases in which the Service has
successfully challenged the reasonableness of compensation
paid by a public company.154
do not indicate an attempt by the shareholders to recharacterize a
nondeductible amount into compensation, Stumpff states that “[e]ven in Patton
. . . the relationship among the parties was likely something less than
completely arm’slength.” Id. at 378 (citing Kafka, supra note 152, at A5); see
also Sikon, supra note 148, at 308 (“In Patton, the party to whom unreasonable
payments were made was neither an owner nor a relative of an owner, but
rather an elderly, favored employee. Although he was not a related party in the
sense of actual family, a strong personal relationship that evolved over many
years of employment made the transaction less than arms’ length.”). In Patton,
the dissent analyzed the history of the Service’s inquiry into the reasonableness
of compensation paid by a corporation noting that, where a deduction was
disallowed:
In all of these cases, the amounts were paid to officers who were
really the beneficial owners of the corporation and who controlled its
action in contracting for and paying them the unusually high salaries
based upon net profits. The reasons the courts have held such salaries
were not deductible as “ordinary and necessary expenses,” were
because they were not, in fact, compensation . . . but profits diverted to
stock holding officers under the guise of salaries; and that a
distribution of profits “under the guise of salaries” to officers who held
the stock of a company and controlled its affairs, is not an ordinary
and necessary expense, within the meaning of the statute . . . .
. . . As was said in United States v. Philadelphia Knitting Mills Co.,
supra, the Government has no right to inquire into and determine
whether the amount of the salary was proper, or whether it was too
much or too little, but only “whether the amount paid is salary or
something else.”
Patton, 168 F.2d at 33 (quoting United States v. Phila. Knitting Mills Co, 273 F.
657, 658 (3d Cir. 1921) (McAllister, J., dissenting)).
154. Professor Stabile provides four cases in which the Service challenged the
reasonableness of compensation paid by a public corporation. See Stabile, supra
note 24, at 85 & n.14. In two of these cases, the compensation paid was found to
be reasonable and the taxpayer was allowed the deduction. See BrownForman
Distillers Corp. v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 711 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Pfeifer
Brewing Co. v. Comm’r, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 586 (1952). The third case, R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 889 (Ct. Cl. 1957), aff’d, 260
F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1958), was “not so much an issue of excessive compensation as it
was a claim that the method for allocating stock under a bonus arrangement
made the stock distribution more like a dividend than a compensation
payment.” Stabile, supra note 24, at 85 n.14 (citing R.J. Reynolds, 149 F. Supp.
at 12). The final case, Patton, “involved a suspicion that the employer and not
the employee actually kept the compensation.” Stabile, supra note 24, at 85 n.14
(citing Patton, 168 F.2d at 29). For a discussion of Patton, see supra note 153.
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Second, the Service has attempted to apply a
reasonableness standard to compensation paid by S
corporations only in situations where an adjustment to the
amount treated as compensation would result in a tax
adjustment.155 Since a taxpayer that is both the owner and
an employee of an S corporation can receive corporate
distributions either in the form of salary or dividend
distributions, taxpayer gamesmanship in characterizing
payments as either the former or the latter can result in the
shareholderemployee receiving the same economics at the
expense of the fisc. In this context, the Service has
challenged the reasonableness of compensation in two
circumstances: first, in situations where the compensation
was unreasonably high; second, in situations where the
compensation is unreasonably low.156
With respect to excessive compensation, the Service had
challenged the reasonableness of compensatory payments in
But see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7735027 (May 31, 1977), where, without reaching a
conclusion on the question of fact, the Service noted that Section 162(a)(1)
allows a deduction for compensation that is reasonable in amount and for
services actually rendered. Id. The taxpayer at issue in the private letter ruling
was a publicly traded corporation. Id. However, even in such situation, the facts
indicate that the compensation arrangement was connected to a potential
repurchase of the stock of the corporate executives. Id. The Service concluded
the ruling by stating that,
[I]t is held that the payments made by M to A and B in accordance with
the agreements described above are deductible by M as compensation
under section 162 of the Code to the extent that such payments when
added to all other compensation paid by M to A and B, are reasonable
in amount and for services actually rendered by A and B to M. The
question of whether such payments are, in fact, reasonable in amount
and for services actually rendered, rather than for the stock of N, which
A and B agreed to sell to M are questions of fact to be determined upon
audit by the appropriate office of the District Director.
Id.
155. See Sikon, supra note 148, which states:
The incidence of section 162 challenges to subchapter S corporation
payments are relatively infrequent and limited to special situations in
which there is a potential tax increase accompanying an adjustment.
. . . That is, due to the lack of inherent double taxation applicable to C
corporation dividends, an S corporation owner has no tax avoidance
purpose to achieve by overcompensating himself or other owners.
Id. at 30809 (footnote omitted).
156. Id. at 310.
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situations in which the payment of excessive compensation
would have resulted in tax avoidance as a result of the
difference in tax rates for earned and unearned income of S
corporation shareholders.157 Between 1971 and 1981, Section
1348 provided for a maximum marginal tax rate of fifty
percent on earned income at a time when the highest
marginal rate on unearned income was seventy percent.158
During that period, the Service challenged the
reasonableness of compensation to determine whether the
owners of S corporations were paying excessive
compensation in an attempt to convert unearned income
into earned income.159
Belowmarket compensation, on the other hand, allows
a shareholderemployee to avoid payroll tax liabilities.160 In
157. Id.
158. Section 1348 was added to the Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub.
L. 91172, § 804(a), 83 Stat. 487, 685 (effective for tax years beginning December
31, 1970). Section 1348 was repealed effective for tax years beginning after
December 31, 1981. See Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 9734, §
101(c)(1), 95 Stat. 172, 183.
159. See, for example, RTS Investment Corp. v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 647
(8th Cir. 1989), where in upholding the lower court’s determination that salaries
paid to a corporation’s shareholders were not reasonable in amount, the court
stated that “the burden of proving reasonableness of compensation is on the
taxpayer and ‘close scrutiny’ is required of salary arrangements between a
corporation and its shareholders.” Id. at 650 (citations omitted). See also Hilt v.
Comm’r, 899 F.2d 1225, No. 887331, 1990 WL 42264 (9th Cir. 1990)
(unpublished table decision); Chi. Stadium Corp. v. United States, No. 88 C
3706, 1991 WL 185227, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 1991) (“[T]he payment must be
made for services rendered to the corporate employer and not for something
else—whether a dividend distribution or anything else—in disguise.”). For cases
upholding the taxpayer’s determination of a reasonable amount of
compensation, see Trucks, Inc. v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 638, 642 (D. Neb.
1984), aff’d, 763 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[C]ompensation paid to employee
shareholders by closely held corporations are subject to careful scrutiny in order
to insure that what is really a distribution of dividends may not be passed off as
a payment of compensation.”); Wigutow v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (PH) ¶ 83,620
(1983); Schiff v. Comm’r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 659 (1980) (“Where officer
shareholders, who are in control of a corporation, set their own compensation,
careful scrutiny is required to determine whether the alleged compensation is in
fact a distribution of profits.”).
160. See I.R.C. § 3111 (2006) (subjecting wages, but not dividends, to the
Social Security and Medicare excise taxes). See also Construction & Design Co.
v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 563 F.3d 593 (7th Cir.
2009), in which the court notes that:
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those cases, the Service has attempted to recharacterize
dividends paid by an S corporation as compensation subject
to payroll taxes.161 For example, in Radtke v. United States,
the court held that a lawyer who worked fulltime for his
wholly owned professional S corporation and drew no salary
would be subject to employment taxes on dividends
withdrawn from the corporation.162 In analyzing the case
before it, the court noted that it was obligated “to look at the
substance, not the form, of the transactions at issue[,]”163
and that, determining whether dividends could be
recharacterized as wages where the amount of wages paid
were unreasonably low, “is simply the flip side of those
instances in which corporations attempt to disguise profit
distributions as salaries for whatever tax benefits that may
produce.”164
The distinction between accounting profits, losses, assets, and
liabilities, on the one hand and cash flow on the other is especially
important when one is dealing with either a firm undergoing
reorganization in bankruptcy or a small privately held firm; in the
latter case, in order to avoid double taxation (corporate income tax
plus personal income tax on dividends), the company might try to
make its profits disappear into officers’ salaries. See Menard, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 560 F.3d 620, 621 (7th Cir. 2009). The owners of a
Subchapter S corporation, however, have the opposite incentive—to
alchemize salary into earnings. A corporation has to pay employment
taxes, such as state unemployment insurance tax and social security
tax, on the salaries it pays. A Subchapter S corporation can avoid
paying them by recharacterizing salary as a distribution of corporation
income.
Id. at 59596. This issue plagued John Edwards during the 2004 presidential
campaign. See Laura Saunders, The Unforeseen Risks of Underplaying Your
Income, W ALL ST . J., Feb. 5, 2011, at B9.
161. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 7444, 19741 C.B. 287.
162. 712 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Wis. 1989), aff’d per curiam, 895 F.2d 1196 (7th
Cir. 1990).
163. Id. at 145 (citing Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573
(1978)).
164. Id. at 146 (citing MilesConley Co. v. Comm’r, 173 F.2d 958, 96061 (4th
Cir. 1949)). See also David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, 714 F. Supp. 2d 954
(S.D. Iowa 2010), which cites cases dealing with the substance over form
doctrine to analyze whether dividends paid by an S corporation to its sole
shareholder who was also an employee constituted compensation subject to
employment tax. Id. at 96364. The court denied the taxpayer’s motion for
summary judgment. Id. at 966. The court later held that the Service’s
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As these S corporation cases show, the Service’s concern
is not with the level of compensation paid to an S
corporation shareholder, but, rather, whether an employee
shareholder is using the corporate form and the labels
surrounding the payment (i.e., as compensation or corporate
distribution) in order to avoid the incurrence of taxation.
III. CURRENT TAX PROVISIONS THAT ATTEMPT TO REGULATE
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Currently, four different Code provisions act to limit
executive compensation. First, unless certain exceptions
apply, Section 162(m) prevents publicly traded corporations
from deducting compensation paid to certain corporate
officers in excess of $1 million.165 Second, Sections 280G and
4999 operate in tandem in an attempt to penalize publicly
traded corporations that pay golden parachute payments
and the employees that receive such payments.166 Finally,
Section 409A provides rules governing the tax treatment of
nonqualified deferred compensation.167 More specifically,
under Section 409A, unless certain requirements are
satisfied, amounts deferred under a nonqualified deferred
compensation plan are currently includible in income to the
extent not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.168
Section 409A merely imposes timing rules, and has no
impact on the amount of compensation the employer can
pay or deduct.169 Because Section 409A neither limits itself
to the compensation paid by publicly traded corporations,
nor effects the amount or deductibility of such
compensation, this Part focuses on Sections 162(m), 280G,
and 4999.

recharacterization of dividend and loan payments to the taxpayer as wages was
reasonable. See id. at 963.
165. I.R.C. § 162(m) (West 2010). See infra Part III.A.
166. I.R.C. § 280G (West 2010); I.R.C. § 4999 (2006). See infra Part III.B.
167. I.R.C. § 409A (2006).
168. I.R.C. § 409A(a).
169. See William A. Drennan, The Pirates Will Party On! The Nonqualified
Deferred Compensation Rules Will Not Prevent CEOs From Acting Like
Plundering Pirates and Should Be Scuttled, 33 VT . L. REV . 1, 27 (2008).
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A. Section 162(m)
In 1993, Congress enacted Section 162(m) in an attempt
to deal with the perceived problem of excessive executive
compensation.170 Executive compensation was of significant
interest to the media during the early 1990s, and, in
particular, during the 1992 presidential campaign.171 The
legislative history states that Section 162(m) was motivated
by concerns regarding the amount of executive
compensation paid by public companies, and that the
provision was intended to reduce excessive compensation.172
According to a House report, “the amount of compensation
received by corporate executives has been the subject of
scrutiny and criticism.”173 Congress determined that
“excessive compensation will be reduced if the deduction for
compensation (other than performancebased compensation)
paid to the top executives of publicly held corporations is
limited to $1 million per year.”174
170. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 10366, §
13211(a), 107 Stat. 312, 46971; see also Conway, supra note 24, at 396.
171. See Conway, supra note 24, at 396; Kevin J. Ryan, Rethinking Section
162(m)’s Limitation on the Deduction of Executive Compensation: A Review of
the Commentary, 15 VA. TAX REV. 371, 371 (1995); Kenneth R. Ferris & James
S. Wallace, I.R.C. Section 162(m) and the Law of Unintended Consequences
(Nov. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=942667. During the 1992 presidential campaign, thenGovernor Bill
Clinton stated that “[i]t’s wrong for executives to do what so many did in the
1980s. The biggest companies raised their [executives’] pay four times the
percentage their workers’ pay went up and three times the percentage their
profits went up.” The Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Presidential Candidates Divide on
Executive Compensation Caps, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 42, 1634 (1992).
172. See STAFF OF J. COMM . ON TAXATION, 109 TH CONG., PRESENT L AW AND
BACKGROUND RELATING TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 6 (Comm. Print 2006)
[hereinafter 2006 JCT EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION R EPORT ] (citing H.R. REP .
NO. 103111, at 646 (1993)); see also Camelia M. Kuhnen & Alexandra Niessen,
Is Executive Compensation Shaped by Public Attitudes? (Oct. 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1328572
(providing preliminary evidence that the increased negativity and media
coverage of CEO pay between 1990 and 1992 led to the passage of Section
162(m)).
173. H.R. REP . NO. 103111, at 646.
174. Id. The Conference Committee Report specifically states that Section
162(m) was not intended to “modify the presentlaw requirement that in order
to be deductible compensation must be reasonable.” H.R. REP. NO. 103213, at
584 n.44 (1993) (Conf. Rep.). The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has
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Section 162(m) denies a deduction for applicable
employee remuneration175 paid or accrued with respect to a
covered employee of a publicly held corporation176 in excess
of $1 million.177 A covered employee is defined by reference
to SEC rules governing disclosure of executive
compensation.178 The Code defines a “covered employee” as
noted that “[w]hile in theory the reasonableness requirement could act as a limit
on total compensation paid, this requirement has been applied primarily to
prevent dividends of closelyheld companies (which are not deductible) from
being characterized as compensation (which is deductible).” 2006 JCT
EXECUTIVE C OMPENSATION REPORT , supra note 172, at 6.
175. Unless specifically excluded, Section 162(m) applies to all remuneration
for services, including cash and the cash value of all remuneration (including
benefits) paid in a medium other than cash. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION,
107TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION 27 (Comm. Print 2002). Compensation not subject to the
deduction limit, and not taken into account in determining whether other
compensation exceeds $1 million, includes: (i) remuneration payable on a
commission basis; (ii) remuneration payable solely on account of the attainment
of one or more performance goals if certain independent director and
shareholder approval requirements are met; (iii) payments to a taxqualified
retirement plan (including salary reduction contributions); (iv) amounts
excludable from the executive’s gross income (such as employerprovided health
benefits, groupterm life insurance and miscellaneous fringe benefits); and (v)
compensation payable under a written binding contract in effect as of February
17, 1993 (provided that such contract was not materially modified prior to the
payment of the compensation). See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4) (West 2010). In addition,
Section 162(m) does not apply to certain amounts paid by a corporation that was
not a publicly held corporation and then becomes a publicly held corporation.
Treas. Reg. § 1.16227(f)(1) (as amended in 1996).
176. For these purposes, a corporation is treated as publicly held if the
corporation has a class of common equity securities that is required to be
registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. I.R.C. §
162(m)(2); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.16227(c)(1) (providing that (i) voluntary
registration of securities does not cause a corporation to be publicly held; and (ii)
for purposes of Section 162(m), whether a corporation is publicly held is
determined based solely on whether the corporation is subject to the reporting
obligations of section 12 of the Exchange Act as of the last day of its taxable
year).
177. I.R.C. § 162(m)(1). The $1 million limitation is reduced to $500,000 with
respect to certain employees of certain employers that received TARP funds. See
I.R.C. § 162(m)(5), as added by Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,
P.L. 110343, § 302(a), 122 Stat. 3765, 380306. See supra note 83.
178. I.R.C. § 162(m)(3). Treasury Regulation Section 1.16227(c)(2)(ii) provides
that whether an individual is a covered employee for purposes of Section 162(m)
is to be determined in accordance with the executive compensation disclosure
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an employee of a corporation if such person is either (i) the
chief executive officer of the corporation (or an individual
acting in such capacity) at the end of such year, or (ii) an
employee whose total compensation for such year is
required to be reported because the employee is one of the
four highest compensated officers for the taxable year (other
than the chief executive officer).179 However, as a result of
amendments to the SEC disclosure rules, effective after
December 15, 2006, the Service has administratively refined
such definition.180
rules of the Exchange Act. In accordance with such regulation, an individual is a
covered employee only if he or she is employed as of the last day of the
employer’s taxable year. See Treas. Reg. § 1.16227(c)(2)(i). The Service has
concluded that an officer who resigns his or her position as an officer and
employee prior to the last day of the tax year will not be considered a covered
employee for such year even if, under SEC executive compensation rules, such
person is required to be listed in the corporation’s proxy and continues to
perform services for the corporation as an independent consultant and/or
director, and receive compensation from deferred bonuses, stock options, and
annual income from consulting contracts unless such person intends to resume
his or her responsibilities as a corporate officer in the foreseeable future. I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199928014 (Apr. 13, 1999).
179. I.R.C. § 162(m)(3).
180. The SEC’s rules relating to executive compensation disclosure under the
Exchange Act are contained in Item 402 of Regulation SK. 17 C.F.R. 229.402
(2010). Under the disclosure rules in effect at the time Section 162(m) was
enacted, and for fiscal years ending prior to December 15, 2006, named
executive officers consisted of (i) all individuals serving as a corporation’s chief
executive officer (or acting in a similar capacity) during the last completed fiscal
year regardless of compensation level, and (ii) the corporation’s four most highly
compensated executive officers (other than the CEO) who were serving as
executive officers at the end of the last completed fiscal year. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.402 (2005). A final rule amending the SEC executive compensation
disclosure rules altered the composition of the group of executives that are
covered by Item 402. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2010), amended by Executive
Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8,
2006). As amended, Item 402 provides that the named executive officers consist
of (i) all individuals serving as the corporation’s principal executive officer (or
acting in a similar capacity) during the last completed fiscal year (“PEO”)
regardless of compensation level, (ii) all individuals serving as the corporation’s
principal financial officer (or acting in a similar capacity) during the last
completed fiscal year (“PFO”) regardless of compensation level, and (iii) the
corporation’s three most highly compensated executive officers other than the
PEO and PFO who were serving as executive officers at the end of the last
completed fiscal year. Id. As a result of the change in the SEC disclosure rules,
the Service determined that it needed to issue guidance under Section 162(m).
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In an attempt to tie executive pay to corporate
performance, Congress exempted from Section 162(m) any
performancebased compensation that satisfied three
conditions.181 First, the performance goals are determined by
a compensation committee comprised solely of two or more
outside directors of the corporation.182 Second, the material
terms of the performancebased pay, including the goals
established, are disclosed to shareholders and approved by a
majority of shareholders in a separate vote before the
compensation is paid.183 Third, prior to payment, the
compensation committee provides written certification that
the performance goals and any other material terms were
satisfied.184
Two things happened in reaction to Section 162(m).185
First, some corporations changed their method for
compensating corporate executives, and performancebased
pay (i.e., stock options) became the primary form of
executive compensation for many corporations.186 Second,
some corporations ignored Section 162(m)—continuing to
pay compensation above the $1 million limitation in spite of

See I.R.S. Notice 200749, 20071 C.B. 1429. In Notice 200749, the Service
concluded that for purposes of Section 162(m), the term “covered employee”
includes any employee of a corporation if, at the close of the taxable year, such
employee is either the PEO or an individual acting in such capacity, or if such
employee’s total compensation for that taxable year must be reported to
shareholders under the Exchange Act as being among the three highest
compensated officers other than the PEO or PFO for that taxable year. Id. The
term “covered employee” does not include a corporation’s PFO (or an individual
acting in such capacity). Id.
181. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.16227(e) (as amended in
1995). According to the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, “[w]hile not
specifically mentioned in the legislative history, the exception to the limitation
for performancebased compensation reflects the view that such compensation,
by its nature, is not ‘excessive.’” 2006 JCT EXECUTIVE C OMPENSATION REPORT ,
supra note 172, at 6.
182. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i).
183. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(ii).
184. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(iii).
185. See Conway, supra note 24, at 396.
186. Id.
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the loss of a tax deduction.187 Corporate shareholders bear
the costs of these corporate actions.188
Numerous commentators have noted that Section
162(m) has had the unintended consequence of increasing
executive compensation at publicly held corporations.189
Professor Kathryn Kennedy notes that, rather than
discouraging excessive compensation:
The congressionally mandated $1 million limit on executive salary
became the industry standard. Suddenly all top executives and
key employees expected companies to offer a base salary of one
187. Id.
188. Id. See also Mullane, supra note 87, at 493 (asserting that the burden of
Congress’ efforts to limit executive compensation through the tax code falls on
“rankandfile Americans” to a substantial extent).
189. See, e.g., Conway, supra note 24, at 396. Additionally, see Gary Shorter et
al., Excessive CEO Pay: Background and Policy Approaches, CONG. R ESEARCH
SERV., RS22604 at 5 (Nov. 29, 2007), available at http://opencrs.com/
document/RS22604/20071129/, where the authors state:
P.L. 10366 established code section 162 (m) . . . which imposes a $1
million cap that applies to the CEO and the four nexthighestpaid
officers. No tax deduction for compensation above the $1 million limit is
permitted, except for “performancebased” pay, such as commissions or
stock options, where the ultimate compensation received by the
executive depends on the stock price, reported sales or profits, or some
other financial indicator. The OBRA provision is widely believed to
have contributed to the increased use of stock options in CEO
compensation in the mid and late 1990s. To the extent that this is
true, OBRA may have had the unintended consequence of increasing
CEO pay.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive
Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 926 (2007)
(“The empirical evidence suggests that § 162(m) has had unintended
consequences. Executive compensation has increased, while a large number of
firms are apparently forfeiting valuable tax deductions. Both of these results are
contrary to the intent of Congress.”); Stabile, supra note 24, at 82 n.5 (“One
reason for the large increase in executive compensation over the last decade is
the move toward performancebased compensation, particularly stock options,
which have generated huge returns over the last decade.” (citations omitted));
Stephen M. Salley, Note, “Fixing” Executive Compensation: Will Congress,
Shareholder Activism, or the New SEC Disclosure Rules Change the Way
Business is Done in American Boardrooms?, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 757, 763 (2009)
(“Most commentators have noted that § 162(m) is a classic example of the law of
unintended consequences, because the amendments, designed to reduce
compensation, have actually resulted in higher pay packages as a result of
bonuses and stock options.”).
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million dollars in addition to generous stock options and
retirement benefits. The new base salary was expected regardless
of industry, effect, company development, or shareholder
concerns. The perception existed that boards of directors conceded
to the new base salary because the compensation packages were
completely deductible.190

Professor Kennedy also notes that the focus on
performancebased compensation resulting from Section
162(m) provides corporate executives with an incentive to
focus on shortterm performance.191 According to Professor
Kennedy:
[I]nstead of focusing on longterm objectives, executives
concentrated on quarterly performance. By meeting Wall Street’s
performance expectations, the stock price increased at a faster
pace, generating more shortterm profit for executives upon each
stock sale. Unless the stock option program required a vesting
period of several years, executives could, and did, exercise their
options earlier. In addition, some boards of directors fueled the
problem by awarding executives large amounts of option awards,
allowing executives to sell stock, repricing poor performing stock
options in order to prevent executives from leaving, and back
dating stock options. The perception was that reliance on the use
of options encouraged executives to ignore the longterm effect of
current strategy in favor of their shortterm financial interests,
which increased the risk of dilution for nonemployee
shareholders.192

A related consequence of Section 162(m) is that it
provides corporate executives with an incentive to
manipulate corporate performance to maximize their own
personal wealth.193 Famous securities classaction lawyer
William Lerach described the system created by Section
162(m) as follows:
190. Kathryn J. Kennedy, Excessive Executive Compensation: Prior Federal
Attempts to Curb Perceived Abuses, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 196, 220 (2010)
(citing John A. Byrne, That’s Some Pay Cap, Bill, BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 25, 1994,
at 57, available at http://www.businessweek.com/archives/1994/b336854.
arc.htm).
191. See id. (citing Lee E. Sheppard, Big Paydays Are Back!, 124 TAX NOTES 99
(2009)).
192. Id. at 221.
193. Martin D. Mobley, Compensation Committee Reports PostSarbanes
Oxley: Unimproved Disclosure of Executive Compensation Policies and Practices,
1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 111, 123 (2005).
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[W]hether driven by greed or envy—or perhaps both—it is clear
now
that
an
increasingly
lavish—crazy—stockoption
compensation system incentivized corporate executives to do
whatever—and I mean whatever—had to be done to meet earnings
expectations, so that they could achieve corporate earnings targets
to trigger their performance bonuses and boost the stock price so
that their stock options could be exercised and they could sell
stock at high prices.194

It is not just commentators that are critical of Section
162(m). The same government that enacted this provision in
1993 is now critical of the consequences caused by its
passage. For example, Christopher Cox, the former
chairman of the SEC and Congressman, stated before
Congress:
[O]ne of the most significant reasons that nonsalary forms of
compensation have ballooned since the early 1990s is the $1
million legislative cap on salaries for certain top public company
executives that was added to the Internal Revenue Code in 1993.
As a Member of Congress at the time, I well remember that the
stated purpose was to control the rate of growth in CEO pay. With
complete hindsight, we can now all agree that this purpose was
not achieved. Indeed, this tax law change deserves pride of place
in the Museum of Unintended Consequences.195

Many corporations, concluding that compliance with
Section 162(m) would interfere with their business
judgment, have decided that it is in their best longterm
interests to pay compensation that is not deductible.196 In
194. William Lerach, Plundering America: How American Investors Got Taken
for Trillions by Corporate Insiders, 8 STAN. J.L. B US . & FIN. 69, 96 (2002)
(footnote omitted).
195. Stock Options Backdating: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Rep. Christopher
Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n), available at http://www.sec.gov
/news/testimony/2006/ts090606cc.htm (speaking about SEC disclosure rules
regarding executive compensation). The Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation has noted that a number of studies also support the fact that Section
162(m) has not reduced the growth in executive compensation. See 2006 JCT
EXECUTIVE C OMPENSATION REPORT , supra note 172, at 7 (citations omitted).
196. See Conway, supra note 24, at 405 (citing Steven Balsam & Qin Jennifer
Yin, Explaining Firm Willingness to Forfeit Tax Deductions Under Internal
Revenue Code Section 162(m): The MillionDollar Cap, 24 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y
300, 321 (2005) (finding that almost forty percent of affected corporations
forfeited deductions rather than comply with the $1 million cap)); see also
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these cases, Section 162(m) acts to increase the cost of
executive compensation.197
The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, in a
review of the Enron Corporation and its related entities
following the Enron bankruptcy,198 concluded that “[t]he $1
Polsky, supra note 189, at 926 (“The empirical evidence suggests that § 162(m)
has had unintended consequences. Executive compensation has increased, while
a large number of firms are apparently forfeiting valuable tax deductions. Both
of these results are contrary to the intent of Congress.”). As an illustration of the
ineffectiveness of Section 162(m), note the disclosure found in the 2009 Proxy
Statement for Oracle Compensation:
In
evaluating
potential
compensation
alternatives,
our
Compensation Committee considers the possible impact of
Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the
“Code”). Section 162(m) of the Code places a limit of $1 million on the
amount of compensation that we may deduct as a business expense in
any year with respect to certain of our most highly paid executives
unless, among other things, such compensation is performance based
and has been approved by stockholders. We therefore design our
executive compensation program, including our annual performance
cash bonus plan and our stock option grants, to be eligible for
deductibility to the extent permitted by the relevant tax regulations,
including Section 162(m) of the Code. However, we may from time to
time pay compensation to our senior executives that may not be
deductible if there are nontax reasons for doing so.
ORACLE CORP. 2009 PROXY STATEMENT 36 (2010) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/investorrelations/proxy/orcl2010proxy
170698.pdf. Notwithstanding the fact that all of Oracle’s 2009 compensation
qualified for a deduction under Section 162, Larry Ellison earned approximately
$130 million that year. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
197. See Conway, supra note 24, at 40506.
198. In February 2002, Senator Max Baucus and Senator Charles E. Grassley
of the Senate Finance Committee directed the staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation to review the Enron Corporation and related entities:
The review focused on two principal areas: (1) Enron’s use of tax shelter
arrangements, offshore entities, and special purpose entities, and (2)
the compensation arrangements of Enron employees, including tax
qualified retirement plans, nonqualified deferred compensation
arrangements, and other arrangements, in order to analyze the factors
that may have contributed to the loss of benefits and the extent to
which losses were experienced by different groups of employees.
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REP. OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON
CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND
COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (Comm. Print 2003)
[hereinafter JCT ENRON REPORT ].
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million deduction limitation was designed to address
corporate governance concerns that top executives were
receiving excessive compensation. The experience with
Enron indicates that the limitation is not effective in
achieving its purposes. Taxpayers may choose to pay
nondeductible compensation, and accept the potential
adverse tax consequences.”199
The Joint Committee recommended that Section 162(m)
be repealed and that laws other than the tax code be used to
address excessive compensation issues.200
B. Sections 280(g) and 4999
Section 162(m) was not Congress’ first attempt at
defining reasonable compensation in the public company
context. Ten years earlier, in 1984, Congress attempted to
limit golden parachute arrangements made by public
corporations to key executives.201 According to Congress,
such arrangements were designed to dissuade interested
buyers from pursuing an acquisition, drive up the cost of
corporate acquisitions, or encourage corporate executives

199. Id. at 43. For 1998 through 2000, $48.5 million, or eleven percent of total
compensation paid by Enron to its management, was nondeductible under
Section 162(m). Id. at 4243.
200. Id. at 43.
201. One commentator describes “golden parachute agreements” as follows:
In response to increasing corporate mergers and acquisitions, target
corporations have developed defensive tactics designed to discourage
both tender offers and successful takeovers by aggressor corporations.
One defensive tactic, increasingly popular with corporate
management, is the “golden parachute” agreement. Golden parachute
agreements provide for lucrative payments to key executives in the
event of change in corporate ownership or control. Theoretically, the
cost of these payments increases overall takeover costs and thereby
discourages takeover attempts.
Dana M. Leonard, Golden Parachutes and Draconian Measures Aimed at
Control: Is Internal Revenue Code Section 280G the Proper Regulatory Mode of
Shareholder Protection?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1293, 1293 (1986) (footnotes
omitted).
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with parachute arrangement to pursue acquisitions not in
the best interests of their shareholders.202
As part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Congress
enacted Sections 280G and 4999 to “discourage transactions
which tended to reduce amounts which might otherwise be
paid to target corporation shareholders.”203 Section 280G
restricts the ability of a corporation to deduct excess
parachute payments, while Section 4999 imposes an excise
tax of twenty percent on recipients of such amounts.204
For these purposes, a “parachute payment” is any
payment in the nature of compensation (including payments
to be made under a covenant not to compete or similar
arrangement) that meets three requirements. First, the
payment is made to (or for the benefit of) a disqualified
individual.205 Second, such payment is contingent on a
202. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 199200
(Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter 1984 JCT REPORT ].

OF THE

203. Id. at 201; see I.R.C. § 280G(a) (West 2010); I.R.C. § 4999(a) (2006); see
also Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98369, 98 Stat. 464. Congress
believed that:
In almost any takeover situation, be it hostile or friendly, the
acquiring company in theory will pay a maximum amount and no
more. To the extent some of that amount, directly or indirectly, must
be paid to executives and other key personnel of the target corporation,
because of the existence of golden parachutes or similar arrangements,
there is less for the shareholders of that corporation. Congress decided
to discourage transactions which tended to reduce amounts which
might otherwise be paid to target corporation shareholders.
1984 JCT REPORT , supra note 202, at 201; see also Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden
Parachute Provisions: Time for Repeal?, 21 VA. TAX REV. 125, 126 (2001); Jamie
Dietrich Hankinson, Comment, Golden Parachute Tax Provisions Fall Flat: Tax
Grossups Soften Their Impact to Executives and Square D Overinflates Their
Coverage, 34 STETSON L. REV. 767, 770 (2005).
204. See I.R.C. § 280G; I.R.C. § 4999; see also 1984 JCT REPORT , supra note
202, at 200. The twenty percent excise tax imposed by Section 4999 is in
addition to the regular income and Social Security taxes imposed on the
payment. See I.R.C. §§ 4999(a), (c)(1).
205. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A). Hankinson notes that,
The phrase “golden parachute payment” has a different meaning in
common business usage than in a tax context. As commonly used, the
term refers to large severance payments made when an executive’s
employment is terminated following a corporate acquisition. However,
for federal income tax purposes, the phrase, “golden parachute
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change in the ownership or effective control of a corporation,
or in the ownership of a substantial portion of its assets.206
Third, the aggregate present value of all such payments
made or to be made to the disqualified individual equals or
exceeds three times the disqualified individual’s base
amount.207 In addition, a parachute payment includes “any
payment in the nature of compensation to (or for the benefit
of) a disqualified individual if such payment is made
pursuant to any agreement that violates any generally
enforced securities laws or regulations.”208 Sections 280G
and 4999 generally are limited to public corporations.209
A disqualified individual is any employee, independent
contractor, or other person (specified in Treasury
Regulations) who performs personal services for the
corporation and who is an officer, shareholder, or highly
compensated individual of the corporation.210 A highly
compensated individual is an individual who is (or would be
if the individual were an employee) among the highest paid
one percent of the employees (or, if less, among the 250
highest paid employees) of the corporation.211
payment,” has a definition that is keyed to a change in corporate
control and is not limited to severance or other termination payments,
but instead applies to any payment of compensation.
Hankinson, supra note 203, at 773.
206. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A)(i). But see 2006 JCT EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
REPORT , supra note 172, at 44 (stating, incorrectly, that “[i]n some cases, the
compensation agreement for a corporate executive may provide for payments to
be made if the executive loses his or her job as a result of a change in control of
the company. Such payments are referred to as ‘golden parachute payments’”).
207. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A)(ii). An individual’s base amount is the average
annual compensation includible in the individual’s gross income over the five
taxable years of such individual preceding the individual’s taxable year in which
the change in ownership or control occurs. If the individual did not perform
services for the corporation throughout that entire fiveyear period, the relevant
period is that portion of the fiveyear period in which he or she did perform
services for the corporation (with compensation for any portion of a taxable year
being annualized before an average is determined). I.R.C. § 280G(b)(3); 1984
JCT REPORT , supra note 202, at 200.
208. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(B).
209. See I.R.C. § 280G(b)(5).
210. I.R.C. § 280G(c). Personal service corporations and similar entities are
generally treated as individuals for this purpose. I.R.C. § 280G(c).
211. I.R.C. § 280G(c).
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Under Section 280G, a corporation will be denied a tax
deduction only for the portion of a parachute payment that
qualifies as an excess parachute payment.212 Section 280G
defines excess parachute payment as the amount by which
the parachute payment exceeds the individual’s base
amount.213 However, the portion of the payment that the
corporation establishes by clear and convincing evidence is
reasonable compensation for personal services actually
rendered before the change in control will reduce the
amount treated as an excess parachute payment.214 The
legislative history to Sections 280G and 4999 suggests that
such a reduction will only occur in rare circumstances:
The Congress believed that in most large, publiclyheld
corporations, top executives are not undercompensated.
Accordingly, the Congress contemplated that only in rare cases, if
any, will any portion of a parachute payment be treated as
reasonable compensation in response to an argument that a
disqualified individual with respect to such a corporation was
undercompensated for periods prior to the change in ownership
or control.215

These provisions, however, have not accomplished
Congress’ stated goals at the time of enactment.216 “In
practice, corporations continue to make these payments,
212. I.R.C. § 280G(a).
213. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(1).
214. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(4).
215. 1984 JCT REPORT , supra note 202, at 204. The Conference Report gives
the following examples of reasonable compensation:
(1) payments in cancellation of a normal stock option, or normal stock
appreciation right, granted more than one year before the change; (2)
exercises after termination of stock options or stock appreciation rights
issued as part of a normal compensation package granted more than
one year before the change; (3) compensation previously earned and
deferred pursuant to a plan of the employer, such as a staggered bonus
plan, or at the election of the employee; and (4) amounts paid under a
retirement plan that supplements a taxqualified plan to the extent
such amounts are designed to compensate a newlyhired key employee
for the loss of retirement benefits attributable to services performed for
a prior employer.
H.R. Rep. No. 99861, at 85253 (1984) (Conf. Rep.); see also 1984 JCT REPORT ,
supra note 202, at 204.
216. See, e.g., Hankinson, supra note 203, at 770.
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despite the payments being nondeductible, and executives
continue to receive these payments, despite the excise tax
imposed.”217 In fact, the enactment of these two provisions
led to several unintended consequences that have increased
the use of golden parachute arrangements and their cost to
corporate shareholders. First, according to Professor
Kennedy, “[Section 280G] was viewed as tacit approval by
the government of these arrangements as long as the award
provided did not exceed three times base compensation.
Indeed, ‘hundreds of companies that had no changein
control agreements’ introduced these arrangements soon
after section 280G was enacted.”218
Second, some companies reduced or eliminated the cost
of the excise tax imposed on corporate executives pursuant
to Section 4999 through the use of grossup payments to
executives.219 The economic effect of a grossup provision is
217. Id. In addition, Professors Cherry and Wong note:
Yet another form of compensation that has proven to be
controversial is the socalled golden parachute, a payment to the
executive that is typically triggered in the event of a change of control
in the corporation. The ostensible reason to adopt golden parachutes is
to align the interest of the management with shareholders’ interests—
otherwise, incumbent management might resist an acquisition for the
purpose of perpetuating their own tenure. However, in the vivid words
of one commentator, golden parachutes conjure the “image of a
laughing executive landing softly with oodles of misappropriated
corporate assets while his corporation goes down in flames.”
Cherry & Wong, supra note 80, at 374 (citations omitted).
218. Kennedy, supra note 190, at 204 (citing Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J.
Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got Here, What are the
Problems, and How to Fix Them 28 (ECGI Finance Working Paper Series in
Finance No. 44/2004, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305; see
also Conway, supra note 24, at 41419; Richard P. Bress, Note, Golden
Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L. REV. 955, 963 n.38 (1987);
Miske, supra note 87, at 1680.
219. See, e.g., Conway, supra note 24, at 417 (“The enactment of [sections]
280G and 4999 resulted in executives often requiring that the company pay the
excise tax to the IRS on behalf of the executive if they are to be paid a golden
parachute payment.”); Wolk, supra note 203, at 13940. See also Corporate
Counsel’s Guide to Employment Contracts, which sets forth the purpose of a
grossup provision as follows:
The purpose of a tax grossup allowance is to provide an executive with
sufficient additional benefits to pay the parachute tax on the benefits to
which he or she is entitled without the grossup and the parachute and
income taxes on the grossup benefits so that his or her net aftertax
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to transfer the punitive effects of the Section 4999 excise tax
from the executive receiving the golden parachute payment
to the corporation’s shareholders.220
Commentators generally observe that the golden
parachute rules have done little to affect the amount of
position is equal to the position the executive would have been in had
there been no parachute penalty tax.
CORP . C OUNS . GD. T O EMPL . CONTRACTS § 14:45 (2007).
220. See Hankinson, supra note 203, at 77071. See also Stabile, supra note 24,
noting that:
There is evidence that not only have many corporations foregone the
deduction, but a number have also added a “gross up” to the
compensation paid to executives to take account of the tax imposed by
section 280G; that is, they increase the payment made by an amount
equal to the taxes that the executive will be required to pay. Thus,
instead of eliminating or minimizing golden parachutes, the effect of
the tax imposed by section 280G is to make such payments more
expensive to the corporations.
Id. at 93 (citing Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley Continental, Inc., CIV. A. No. 9813,
1988 WL 46064 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988)). In Tate & Lyle, the court discussed the
effects of the grossup provisions of a company’s golden parachute arrangement
as follows:
In an effort to assure the full benefits of the golden and tin
parachutes to its employees, Staley adopted a plan of excise tax “gross
ups”, which could cost Staley, at least, $13.8 million. These grossups
require Staley to compensate each beneficiary of a parachute for the
20% federal excise tax mandated by 26 U.S.C. §§ 280G, 4999. In effect,
the grossups insure that each beneficiary receives the full amount of
the parachute without any offset due to the excise tax.
Tate & Lyle PLC, 1988 WL 46064, at *3. See also Corporate Counsel’s Guide to
Employment Contracts, which notes that “the sole beneficiary of the tax gross
up is the U.S. Treasury,” and concludes that:
The cost of either type of tax grossup allowance is very substantial
to the corporation in relation to the benefits provided to the executive.
Based on a 31 percent income tax rate, it costs a corporation, after
taxes (using a 34 percent corporate tax rate), approximately 75 percent
of an individual’s average annual compensation to provide the
individual with pretax benefits equal to 299 percent, and posttax
benefits equal to 207 percent, of the individual’s average annual
compensation to provide an individual with pretax benefits equal to
415 percent and posttax benefits equal to 224 percent of the
individual’s average annual compensation. Therefore, the corporate
aftertax cost doubles in order to provide the individual, after tax, with
an additional 17 percent of average annual compensation.
CORP . C OUNS . GD. T O EMPL . CONTRACTS , supra note 219, § 14:45.
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compensation payable upon a change of control. Rather, the
rules are often thought of as providing a road map as to how
to structure compensation arrangements. The government
best summarized the effects of Sections 280G and 4999
when it stated “[i]t is not uncommon for employment
agreements to provide that, in the event the employee is
subject to the excise tax, the tax will be paid by the
company, with a gross up to reflect the income tax payable
as a result of the employer’s payment of the tax.”221

221. Written Testimony of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation on
Executive Compensation and CompanyOwned Life Insurance Arrangements of
Enron Corporation and Related Entities Before the S. Comm. of Fin., 110th
Cong. 31 n.44 (2003) (statement of Mary M. Schmitt, Acting Chief of Staff of the
Joint Comm. on Taxation). For a discussion on how shareholders bear the
burden of these antigolden parachute provisions, see Conway, supra note 24,
concluding that:
In summary, because parachute payments are often still part of
executive compensation contracts, whatever the reasons, corporations
are now losing deductions for any excess compensation paid plus the
extra twenty percent excise taxes often paid on behalf the executives.
As such, the antigolden parachute provisions do not make the
corporate compensation structure better for shareholders; rather, they
make the whole prospect more expensive for the shareholders. While
the executives remain in the same favorable position, the corporations
have to forfeit the deductions, resulting in less profit for the
shareholders. In addition, the shareholders still face the possibility
that the corporation is too expensive to purchase. These results are
inconsistent with the intent behind the provisions, mainly to help
protect shareholder interests.
Id. at 419.
See also Hankinson, supra note 203, where the author states:
Ironically, Congress’s concern that shareholders were receiving less
money for their shares in mergers as a result of golden parachute
payments has been exacerbated by §§ 280G and 4999 and tax gross
ups. Eliminating §§ 280G and 4999 would actually decrease the cost of
mergers and increase the money paid to the target shareholders or
acquirer’s shareholders over time. However, if Congress intends to
legislate corporate conduct through § 280G, then, at a minimum, §
4999 should be repealed. Section 4999 is not effective in deterring
executives from accepting golden parachute payments when the
corporation pays the additional tax for the executive. When the
corporation also grosses up for the executive’s individual income tax on
these payments, the total cost to the corporation increases.
Id. at 802 (footnote omitted).
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IV. ARGUING AGAINST EXTENDING A REASONABLENESS
STANDARD TO THE PUBLIC CORPORATION
More than a dozen years ago, Professor Stabile observed
that Congress’ attempts to limit executive compensation—
both through the general reasonableness limitation on
executive compensation and specific Code provisions such as
Sections 162(m), 280G, and 4999—were not “operating to
affect executive compensation in a significant way.”222 In
fact, there is evidence that Congress’ attempts to limit
executive compensation have had the effect of increasing
pay and imposing additional costs on the corporations and
shareholders that Congress might be expected to protect.223
Professor Stabile then asks “whether the Code can and
should serve as a more aggressive constraint.”224 She offers
two distinct potential congressional goals for limiting
executive compensation through the Code: revenue raising
and a social goal of regulating executive pay.225 Her
conclusion is that “the Code has no role in policing executive
compensation.”226 With respect to the first rationale,
Professor Stabile notes that “[w]hile raising revenue is a
legitimate use of the Code, raising tax revenues does not
appear to be Congress’ goal in enacting the provisions that
currently limit the executive compensation deduction.”227
With respect to government’s goal of regulating executive
pay, Stabile argues that such decision should remain with
the corporation rather than the government—provided that
the shareholders “are aware of what executives are being
paid and have the ability to express displeasure if they do
not like the decisions being made by the board . . . .”228
222. Stabile, supra note 24, at 94.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 185200, 21621.
224. Stabile, supra note 24, at 94.
225. Id. at 94100.
226. Id. at 101.
227. Id.; see also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., ESTIMATED
BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 2641, at 1 (Comm. Print
1993) (estimating that Section 162(m) would increase revenue by only $42
million in 1994, and by $335 million over a five year period); 1984 JCT REPORT,
supra note 202, at 207 (estimating that Sections 280G and 4999 would increase
fiscal year budget receipts by less than $5 million per year).
228. See Stabile, supra note 24, at 101.
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Today, the question of the government’s role in
regulating executive pay remains fertile ground for debate.
While some ask “why bother,”229 many commentators
continue to believe that the government has a role in
policing executive pay.230 Regulating executive pay through
additional corporate disclosure231 or the judiciary232 is
beyond the scope of this Article. This author believes,
however, that it would be inappropriate to continue to
attempt to control the level of executive compensation
through the tax code.
Despite the numerous commentators who have
analyzed this issue and determined that the Code has been
ineffective in controlling the pay of executives of public
corporations, one commentator continues to argue that
Section 162(a)(1) should be enforced against public
corporations in addition to private corporations.233 Aaron
Zelinsky’s arguments echo those expressed by his father,
Professor Edward Zelinsky, almost a generation ago234—
arguments that the elder Zelinsky has since abandoned.235
229. See, e.g., Markham, supra note 66, at 33647.
230. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, Essay, The Answer to Excessive Executive
Compensation Is Risk, Not the Market, 2 J. B US . & TECH. L. 403 (2007) (arguing
for both increased director independence and greater equity ownership of both
directors and executives in companies that they manage); Matthew Farrell,
Note, A Role for the Judiciary in Reforming Executive Compensation: The
Implications of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Bank of America Corp.,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 169 (2010) (arguing for a more active role for the judiciary);
Zelinsky, supra note 13 (arguing for increased scrutiny by the Service under
Section 162(a)(1)).
231. But see Elson, supra note 230, at 404 (noting that corporate disclosure
will not solve the problem of excessive executive compensation).
232. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 230.
233. See Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 644.
234. See Zelinsky, supra note 38.
235. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Eberl’s, Independent Investors, and the
Incoherence of the Reasonable Compensation Rule, 92 TAX NOTES 555, 559 (2001)
(“Under all of the circumstances, the best alternative is to abolish the
reasonable compensation rule by repealing it legislatively.”). See also Edward A.
Zelinsky, Is Martha Stewart Reasonably Compensated?, 99 TAX NOTES 919
(2003), where Professor Zelinsky states:
I once believed that the tax system could and would scrutinize the
reasonability of compensation granted by publicly traded corporations
to their managers. I believe this no more. . . .
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Professor Zelinsky argued, in 1993, that the
overpayment of executive compensation inflates a
corporation’s tax deductions, which, in turn, reduces the
corporate tax base.236 Since corporate executives have the
ability to set their own salaries, the argument continues,
they in effect constitute an unofficial class of shareholders,
and the excessive compensation they receive is essentially
equivalent to nondeductible dividends.237 By allowing the
deduction of such dividends, the Service has allowed public
corporations to understate their taxable income.238
Professor Zelinsky’s argument would have been more
convincing if he had not then stated that “[w]hether the
Treasury loses revenue from this erosion of the corporate
tax base is unclear and, ultimately, irrelevant.”239 It is
puzzling that one could argue against the erosion of the
corporate tax base if it is not known whether particular
actions have the effect of reducing the amount of tax
collected. If, rather, Professor Zelinsky’s argument was one
in favor of “assuring the accuracy of the tax base” regardless
of the amount of tax collected, the argument appears to be
more logical.240 Although this argument targets the right
issue, Professor Zelinsky attacks the wrong actors. It is
The longterm solution is a legislative fix to the statute that
abolishes the anomaly that is today the reasonable compensation
doctrine.
Id. at 923.
236. See Zelinsky, supra note 38, at 1123 (“Addressing that question, I
conclude that denying deductibility to excessive managerial compensation will,
in the aggregate, enhance the accuracy with which the code measures the
corporate income tax base: excessive payments to corporate executives are
disguised dividends, corporate earnings diverted from shareholders via
managers’ control of their own terms of employment.”).
237. See id.
238. See id. (“As a matter of tax policy, disallowing deductibility to exorbitant
levels of executive remuneration is an administrable extension of the code’s
current rule that, to preserve the corporate tax base against disguised
dividends, closely held corporations can only deduct reasonable levels of
compensation.”).
239. Id. at 1125.
240. This appears to be the argument made by Professor Zelinsky. See id.
(“Such considerations however, ought not to be controlling when the goal is
assuring the accuracy of the tax base as a goal distinct from (and frequently
incompatible with) maximizing the public fisc.”).
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agreed that the Service should be concerned about the
accuracy of the tax base in situations where shareholders
are overinflating costs and experiencing no economic loss.
But, where the overinflated costs are being paid to the
managers of the corporation, there is a true cost to the
shareholders. Even if one were to agree that executive
compensation were not set by an arm’s length process, such
amount would have to be categorized in one of three ways:
(i) corporate waste,241 (ii) rents extracted by the
management,242 or (iii) theft.243 All three of these items are
generally deductible in computing corporate income.244 The
removal of a tax deduction for these amounts would result
in an overstatement of the corporate tax base, while
allowing a deduction would preserve an accurate
computation of such tax base.
The failure to allow a deduction in the case of excessive
compensation would result in corporate shareholders
bearing the burden of these costs twice: (i) when such waste,
managerial rent or theft is actually incurred through the
compensatory payment; and (ii) when the Service requires
241. One argument that Section 162(a)(1) was intended to limit the scope of
the business expense deduction is that the original revenue regulations
promulgated under the predecessor to Section 162(a)(1) disallowed a deduction
for a salary that constituted “waste or appropriation of assets of the
corporation.” Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 639 (quoting Moran, supra note 97, at
III.B.4). This reference to waste or appropriation of corporate assets was
excluded from subsequent regulations. Moran, supra note 95, at A12. In
addition, this portion of the regulations has never been cited in case law. See
Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 639. According to one commentator, “[t]his may
suggest that any amount of compensation paid by a publicly held corporation
should be per se reasonable.” Moran, supra note 95, at A12. While it is unclear
that the last statement necessary follows from the exclusion of the waste or
appropriation language of the regulations, there is no authority that would
prevent a corporation from deducting amounts found to have been spent
unwisely.
242. Professors Bebchuk and Fried use the term “rents” to describe benefits
received by corporate management greater than those that could have been
obtained through an arm’slength bargaining process. See BEBCHUCK & FRIED,
supra note 38, at 45. Regardless of the manner obtained, there is no authority
that any such rents would be nondeductible when paid by a corporation.
243. Treas. Reg. § 1.1658(a)(1) (1960) (“Except as otherwise provided . . . any
loss arising from theft is allowable as a deduction under section 165(a) for the
taxable year in which the loss is sustained.”).
244. See supra notes 24143.
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the corporation to pay tax on profits that it never realized.
Professor Zelinsky’s argument that corporate management
is an unofficial class of shareholders, and that payments to
such class should be treated in the same manner as
dividends, misses the point.245 The unofficial stock
ownership of which Professor Zelinsky complains is very
different than the actual stock ownership of those who have
invested in the corporation and, regardless of the
meritorious nature of the compensation received, one should
not punish the stockholders for the actions of this separate
class.
Aaron Zelinsky provides little guidance as to his motive
for expanding the scope of Section 162(a)(1), stating only
that Section 162(a)(1) “is best understood as an attempt to
preserve the corporate tax base from erosion . . . .”246
However, no authority is cited for how much erosion is
caused to the corporate tax base by allowing a deduction for
all compensation paid by public corporations.247 If Zelinsky
is taking the approach of his father—that the accuracy of
the tax base is the more important goal248—such position
suffers from the same weaknesses as his father’s arguments
in that it ignores the reality of the corporate structure, and
penalizes the actual shareholders of the corporation in an
attempt to preserve the accuracy of the tax base even where
no showing of inaccuracy exists.
However, the largest problem with Zelinsky’s argument
in favor of expanding the scope of Section 162(a)(1) is that it
would usurp the power of corporate boards of directors in
setting compensation with an amorphous standard of
reasonableness. Unlike Section 162(m), which provides a
brightline standard of $1 million of executive pay, or
Sections 280G and 4999, which take effect only after
parachute payments in excess of three times an executive’s
compensation are made, Section 162(a)(1) provides a
245. See supra text accompanying note 237.
246. Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 641.
247. As stated previously, Professor Edward Zelinsky noted that “whether the
Treasury loses revenue from this erosion of the corporate tax base is unclear
. . . .” Zelinsky, supra note 38, at 1125; see also supra text accompanying note
239.
248. See Zelinsky, supra note 38, at 1125; see also supra note 240 and
accompanying text.
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corporate board no guidance as to the level of deductible
pay.249 Corporations and the Service would be looking in the
rearview mirror—fighting over compensation paid years
earlier—to determine whether an amount paid would be
considered reasonable.250
Even Zelinsky’s father, who once supported an
expansion of Section 162(a)(1) to public corporations prior to
abandoning such position, did not believe that such a vague
standard was workable.251 In fact, Professor Zelinsky argued
for the passage of the brightline, objective test of
reasonableness found in Section 162(m) to analyze the
deductibility of corporate compensation.252
This usurpation of power would occur even without any
clear guidance as to how reasonableness would be
determined. Aaron Zelinsky provides two possible
alternatives.253 First, the Service could examine the
compensation paid by publicly held corporations in an
identical fashion to the manner that Section 162(a)(1) is
249. See supra Part III.AB.
250. See Sikon, supra note 148, at 326. Sikon notes:
[T]he large corporation is on notice through the provisions of Internal
Revenue Code sections 280G and 162(m) as to how to determine the
potentially nondeductible amounts. Except for the reduction to excess
parachute payments for reasonable compensation, these provisions do
not require a highly subjective judgment of value by the government.
They are straightforward mathematical calculations.
Id.
251. See Zelinsky, supra note 38, at 1125.
252. See id. at 112526. For a discussion of the objective test, see Sikon, supra
note 148, which states:
It is only for public policy reasons that these statutory provisions arose,
seemingly to curb abuses in corporate activity that were perceived by
the legislature to have a detrimental effect on the shareholders of the
companies, as well as on the general public. In the spirit of section
162(a), these provisions provide bright line calculations of
presumptively unreasonable compensation and render it non
deductible.
Id. at 32526 (footnotes omitted).
253. See Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 64546. Regardless of the interference of
the Service in corporate governance, Zelinsky concludes that “given the reality
of managerial power and the resulting degradation of the corporate tax base
through unreasonable compensation payments to the executives of publicly held
businesses, one of these solutions is appropriate.” Id. at 646.
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applied to privately held corporations.254 While Zelinsky
argues that this alternative would provide “clear guidance
to public boards,”255 he also notes:
However, such an analysis might not address the systemic
problems which result from managerial power over board
decisions in the public corporate context. If unreasonable
compensation and board capture are widespread phenomena, the
use of comparables could actually hurt, rather than help, preserve
the corporate tax base, as salaries could be increased in tandem
by opportunistic executives.256

This first approach, then, adds nothing to the
conversation regarding the reasonableness of executive pay.
As Zelinsky admits, if unreasonable compensation is a
widespread problem, use of comparables to determine the
reasonableness of a particular corporation’s pay structure
would be ineffective and lead to excessive compensation
becoming the norm.257 If unreasonable compensation is not a
widespread problem, then Zelinsky’s concern about applying
a reasonableness standard to public company pay becomes a
moot issue.
Zelinsky’s second proposed approach, which takes into
account the managerial power theory of executive
compensation, would require the Service to first analyze
whether there was an arm’slength relationship between a
corporation’s management and its board of directors when
the compensation was determined.258 According to Zelinsky,
“[g]reater board independence would indicate a stronger
presumption that compensation is reasonable.”259
While this approach provides an opportunity to
ruminate about the methodology for determining the nature
254. See id. at 645.
255. Id. at 645.
256. Id. at 646.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. Id. Zelinsky notes that this approach would “have the potentially
negative impact of inserting the Service into corporate governance.” Id.
Regardless, however, Zelinsky concludes that “given the reality of managerial
power and the resulting degradation of the corporate tax base through
unreasonable compensation payments to the executives of publicly held
businesses, one of these solutions is appropriate.” Id.
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of the corporate directormanagement relationship, such a
generalized standard provides no roadmap for fixing the
problems with executive pay.260 How would the Service
determine whether there was an arm’slength relationship
between the corporation’s management and its board of
directors? What factors would the Service use to determine
whether managerial power affected the board’s decision to
set executive pay? Until objective standards can be defined,
it is unclear that anything would be accomplished other
than confusion.
The difficulty in determining reasonableness in the
public company context, and this author’s concern with
Zelinsky’s suggestions, arose with the beginning words of
his article. Zelinsky notes that in March 2009, AIG
provoked a firestorm by releasing information about
bonuses to be paid that were “derided as most outrageous
and unreasonable.”261 Zelinsky expresses agreement with
these statements when he states that “taxpayer
subsidization of unreasonable compensation is hardly
limited to AIG.”262 Nowhere in his article, however, does
Zelinsky cite any proof that such compensation is truly
unreasonable (rather than large in absolute amount), that
such compensation was not determined through an arm’s
length process of negotiation, or that AIG’s board of
directors suffers from the problems of managerial power
which troubled Professors Bebchuk and Fried.263 An
expansion of the reasonableness test of Section 162(a)(1)
260. The opportunity to ruminate about the relationship between corporate
directors and corporate managers is not new. Zelinsky distinguishes his article
from his father’s, noting that he has “incorporate[d] recent developments in the
managerial power hypothesis into interpretations of § 162(a)(1), and by
proposing a modification of the IRS and the Court’s decisionmaking processes to
incorporate the managerial power hypothesis.” Id. at 640 n.13. However, in
1993, Professor Zelinsky’s rationale for applying Section 162(a)(1) to public
corporations rested, in part, on “[t]he contemporary critique of executive pay
practices [which] holds that, in the case of publicly held businesses, essentially
undisciplined executives also set their own remuneration at excess levels.”
Zelinsky, supra note 38, at 1124; see also supra text accompanying notes 4951.
261. Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 637 (citing Edmund L. Andrews & Peter
Baker, Bonus Money at Troubled A.I.G. Draws Heavy Criticism, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar.
15,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/business/16aig.html)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
262. Id.
263. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 38, at 46.
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would provide the government with the subjective power to
scrutinize corporate actions on compensation any time that
the public, the press or the Congress “feels” that executive
pay is too much.
Zelinsky argues that there will be three side effects to
his proposal.264 First, limiting deductions for the portion of
executive compensation deemed excessive would stop
“taxpayer subsidies of economically inefficient behavior.”265
Second, applying a reasonableness standard “to publicly
traded corporations would harmonize the tax treatment of
public and private corporations with respect to excessive
executive compensation.”266 Finally, the Service’s litigation
and success in the courts on this issue would potentially
“reduce excessive compensation through shaming and
potential derivative suits.”267
Zelinsky, however, presents no evidence that any of
these benefits would result. Except for a potential
harmonization between publicly traded and privately held
corporations, experience suggests that corporations would
continue to pay compensation at the desired levels—
264. See Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 644.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 645.
267. Id. Zelinsky further states:
Corporations, and the individuals who sit on their boards, may seek to
avoid the negative publicity associated with government suits alleging
excessive compensation for income tax purposes. If so, they will be less
likely to pay excessive salaries. . . . Moreover, the threat of future
derivative action will provide a further check on excessive
compensation. Once the IRS and the courts have made a determination
that particular compensation is excessive under § 162, shareholders
could potentially use that determination to substantiate derivative
suits for recovery against the board for corporate waste.
This Comment does not advocate IRS oversight as the lead
mechanism for purifying the muddled world of executive
compensation: addressing the issues raised by the managerial power
hypothesis will likely require coordinated action by a variety of
governmental and nongovernmental actors. Nevertheless, if the IRS
focuses on ensuring that the corporate tax base is protected against
deduction of unreasonable compensation paid by publicly traded
corporations, shareholders and shareholder activists are likely to be
emboldened by the IRS’s enforcement activities.
Id.
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foregoing a tax deduction where the Service successfully
challenged its pay levels.268 Rather than having the effect of
reducing executive compensation, the more likely result of
the Service’s challenge to executive compensation would be
inurement to the benefit of the Treasury at the expense of a
corporation’s shareholders. In addition, there is no
indication that public shaming or concern regarding
derivative lawsuits would have any effect on the largess of
executive pay. One need only look to Sections 162(m) and
280G, which serve as proxies for determining whether
executive compensation is reasonable. There is no evidence
that either of these provisions have caused corporate boards
to reduce the size of executive pay packages. Instead, as
previously discussed, corporations continue to increase the
amount paid to executives in spite of the fact that these
Code provisions place upon such pay the stamp of
unreasonableness.
In another recently published piece, a remarkably
insightful comment regarding the ability of the government
to use the tax code to affect executive compensation was
made:
In the end, the ingenuity of accountants and lawyers will always
be able to find creative solutions to congressional attempts to limit
executive compensation, particularly via the tax code. In contrast
to legal scholarship, research from the business and economics
academy indicates that executive pay is the result of a competitive
market. Taken at face value, this research strongly suggests that
manipulations of the tax code, effectively government caps on pay,
will cause market distortions. If the law attempts to dictate
compensation at a level below market compensation, the
overwhelming power of the market will find a way around this
problem.269

Such has been the result with Section 162(m) and
Sections 280G and 4999. One can only hope that Congress
will heed these words before enacting future tax legislation
regarding executive compensation.

268. See supra Part III.AB. See also supra note 66, where Professor Yablon
notes that the “economic inefficiency” that concerns Zelinsky may be simply the
cost of doing business through widelyheld public corporations.
269. Salley, supra note 189, at 763 (footnote omitted).
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CONCLUSION
Section 162(a)(1) provides a deduction for a reasonable
allowance for compensation for services actually rendered.
The literal language of the statute, combined with past
practice and an analysis of the legislative history, makes it
clear that such provision was meant to expand the business
expense deduction of Section 162(a) rather than to limit
such deduction.
The problem of excessive executive compensation may
be real or, as much of the research has shown, no problem
may exist. Regardless of which side of this controversy one
believes, one thing is clear: Congress’ attempts to legislate
executive compensation through the Code have had the
unintended consequences of contributing to an increase in
executive pay. While Congress may again in the future
attempt to deal with the public outrage surrounding this
issue, one can only hope that it has learned from its
experience that our tax laws are not the proper mechanism
for regulating executive pay.

